LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

LIBOR rigging (view source)

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-That is not, however, determinative. It was not a criminal offence ''per se'' to fail to comply with the Take-over Code, but that did not stop it being treated in Spens''<ref>{{cite|R|Spens|1991|1 WLR|624}}, which opined that, “our view is that [the Takeover Code] sufficiently resembles legislation as to be likewise regarded as demanding construction of its provisions by a judge.” But the takeover code regulated the behaviour of persons in connection with mergers and acquisitions. It is a quasi-regulatory arrangement. LIBOR determination is not. That “failure to comply with LIBOR could give rise to regulatory consequences” is something quite different: a person may in breaching an employment contract also commit a traffic offence: this does not make an employment contract a quasi-regulatory arrangement.</ref> as something which demanded construction as a question of law in the same way as primary or delegated legislation. Although compliance with LIBOR or EURIBOR was not directly a regulated activity, it
+That is not, however, determinative. It was not a criminal offence ''per se'' to fail to comply with the Take-over Code, but that did not stop it being treated in ''Spens''<ref>{{cite|R|Spens|1991|1 WLR|624}}.</ref> as something which demanded construction as a question of law in the same way as primary or delegated legislation. Although compliance with LIBOR or EURIBOR was not directly a regulated activity, it
 was indirectly so: failure to comply with their provisions could give rise to regulatory consequences.
 }}
+{{casenote|R|Spens}} concerned a breach of the Takeover Code, and expressed the view that “[the Takeover Code] sufficiently resembles legislation as to be likewise regarded as demanding construction of its provisions by a judge.” But inasmuch as the Takeover Code regulates the behaviour in connection with mergers and acquisitions it ''is'' a quasi-regulatory arrangement. The calculation of an interest rate benchmark is not. That failure to comply with its terms “could give rise to regulatory consequences” is beside the point: one may in breaching any contract also breach laws and regulations: this does not make the contract a quasi-regulatory arrangement requiring construction as a penal code.
-But unlike crimes and torts, contracts do not admit of mental states or “culpability”. There is no need for ''[[Mens rea and actus reus|mens rea]]''. You either comply with a contract, on the facts, or you don’t. One’s [[Degrees of liability|intention, recklessness or negligence]] does not come into it.<ref>Any number of tedious JC tracts refer, such as[[contractual negligence|this one]] and [[degrees of liability|this one]].</ref>
+For, unlike crimes and torts, contracts do not admit of mental states or “culpability”. There is no need for ''[[Mens rea and actus reus|mens rea]]''. You either comply with a contract, on the facts, or you don’t. One’s [[Degrees of liability|intention, recklessness or negligence]] does not come into it.<ref>Any number of tedious JC tracts refer, such as[[contractual negligence|this one]] and [[degrees of liability|this one]].</ref>
 Furthermore, under the intellectual theory of criminal law, ignorance is no excuse. This is as axiomatic for an effective criminal justice system as “all interests in cash pass by delivery” is to finance: the criminal justice system would not work were defendants allowed to plead ignorance, even presumptively. ''Ignorantia legis non excusat'', if you are blameless in your inadvertence, is a moral iniquity but still a practical imperative of good government.