LIBOR rigging: Difference between revisions

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Whose job was it to decide what they meant? Was it, in other words, a matter of fact or law?</ol>
Whose job was it to decide what they meant? Was it, in other words, a matter of fact or law?</ol>


US courts, in acquitting Connolly and Black,<ref>''United States v Connolly and Black'', No. 19-3806 (2d Cir. 2022) </ref> had considered them to be matters of ''fact''. The English court considers contractual interpretation of contracts to be a matter of law. This seems right, though it leaves something out, which is ''what did the parties believe the rules to mean?''  
US courts, in acquitting Connolly and Black,<ref>{{citer|United States|Connolly and Black|2d Cir. 2022|No. 19-3806|}} </ref> had considered them to be matters of ''fact''. The English court considers contractual interpretation of contracts to be a matter of law. This seems right, though it leaves something out, which is ''what did the parties believe the rules to mean?''  


Under the intellectual theory of the common law that goes only to mitigation and not liability, though — as we will see — in a market where plainly ''everyone'' shared an opinion, different from the judge’s one, about what the “LIBOR Definition” meant, this risks rendering the law “a ass”.  
Under the intellectual theory of the common law that goes only to mitigation and not liability, though — as we will see — in a market where plainly ''everyone'' shared an opinion, different from the judge’s one, about what the “LIBOR Definition” meant, this risks rendering the law “a ass”.