Legal operations: Difference between revisions

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After all, work needed to be done, and it was the lawyers who would usually do the hard yards, churning out thousands of pages of [[verbiage]], running down every quixotic idea, accommodating every spurious risk factor, war-gaming every nightmare market that the issuer’s finance director could confect. The lawyers regularly worked through the night to meet an artificial deadline imposed by a junior analyst who, when it was met, would ignore the proffered draft for a couple of days before advising, without remorse, that he’d forgotten to mention the deal changed Thursday last, and the draft, knocked up in lieu of a long-planned anniversary dinner, hadn’t been needed in the first place.   
After all, work needed to be done, and it was the lawyers who would usually do the hard yards, churning out thousands of pages of [[verbiage]], running down every quixotic idea, accommodating every spurious risk factor, war-gaming every nightmare market that the issuer’s finance director could confect. The lawyers regularly worked through the night to meet an artificial deadline imposed by a junior analyst who, when it was met, would ignore the proffered draft for a couple of days before advising, without remorse, that he’d forgotten to mention the deal changed Thursday last, and the draft, knocked up in lieu of a long-planned anniversary dinner, hadn’t been needed in the first place.   
====The rise of the [[Magic circle law firm|magic circle]]====
===The rise of the [[Magic circle law firm|magic circle]]===
Forged of these fires was the [[Magic circle law firm|magic circle]], a concept which has been with us since at least the time of the [[First Men]] and, yea, even unto the primordial pagan era before them when [[Children of the Forest]] roamed the [[Bretton Woods|Woods of Bretton]].   
Forged of these fires was the [[Magic circle law firm|magic circle]], a concept which has been with us since at least the time of the [[First Men]] and, yea, even unto the primordial pagan era before them when [[Children of the Forest]] roamed the [[Bretton Woods|Woods of Bretton]].   


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As the roaring nineties wore on, the deal pipeline grew ever fatter. [[The Jolly Contrarian:About|Fortune-seeking young contrarians]] started pitching up in London from all sorts of far flung places clutching foreign degree certificates and the switchboard number for Robert Walters. Law firms hired them — ''us'' — on the spot, rightly supposing they would work like Spartans, expect little by way of pay, and  bugger off after a couple of years to spend the rest of their lives pleasure-boating on Auckland harbour and kicking the crap out of the rest of the world at Rugby Union. A handful stayed, mainly for the cricket.  
As the roaring nineties wore on, the deal pipeline grew ever fatter. [[The Jolly Contrarian:About|Fortune-seeking young contrarians]] started pitching up in London from all sorts of far flung places clutching foreign degree certificates and the switchboard number for Robert Walters. Law firms hired them — ''us'' — on the spot, rightly supposing they would work like Spartans, expect little by way of pay, and  bugger off after a couple of years to spend the rest of their lives pleasure-boating on Auckland harbour and kicking the crap out of the rest of the world at Rugby Union. A handful stayed, mainly for the cricket.  


====The rise of the weaponised legal department====
===The rise of the weaponised legal department===
Still, as the deals came through ever faster, and the legal bills got ever bigger, the bankers began to wonder whether they could rationalise that legal spend a bit. “Perhaps we ''could'' be a bit more economical here,” they reasoned. “And the less we spend on the legals, the nicer our German cars will be.”  
Still, as the deals came through ever faster, and the legal bills got ever bigger, the bankers began to wonder whether they could rationalise that legal spend a bit. “Perhaps we ''could'' be a bit more economical here,” they reasoned. “And the less we spend on the legals, the nicer our German cars will be.”  


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But [[Legal|legal department]]s started to get really ''big''. This was a direct consequence of the wish ''to reduce external legal spend''. The better staffed you were, the less you spent. Within ten years, in-house teams that had numbered a handful were running into the ''hundreds''.
But [[Legal|legal department]]s started to get really ''big''. This was a direct consequence of the wish ''to reduce external legal spend''. The better staffed you were, the less you spent. Within ten years, in-house teams that had numbered a handful were running into the ''hundreds''.
====Here come the management consultants====
===Here come the management consultants===
All good things must die, and as the encroaching [[modernist]] orthodoxy of managing to margins gripped the city, bean-counters turned their attention to the scale of these legal activities. Which, by 2005, was ''colossal''. The sunk cost of legal — pay and perks for four hundred internal lawyers, and the external legals on your massive pipeline of mergers, IPOs and CDOs going out the door, was in the high hundreds of millions of dollars. By the early 2010s, rocked by litigation and regulatory action in the wake of the financial crisis, most global banks’ legal overheads were running into the ''billions''.<ref>The CPP research firm estimated global banks spent a combined $200 ''billion'' on legal fees in just four years, between 2010 and 2014. That buys quite a few chicken dinners.</ref>  
All good things must die, and as the encroaching [[modernist]] orthodoxy of managing to margins gripped the city, bean-counters turned their attention to the scale of these legal activities. Which, by 2005, was ''colossal''. The sunk cost of legal — pay and perks for four hundred internal lawyers, and the external legals on your massive pipeline of mergers, IPOs and CDOs going out the door, was in the high hundreds of millions of dollars. By the early 2010s, rocked by litigation and regulatory action in the wake of the financial crisis, most global banks’ legal overheads were running into the ''billions''.<ref>The CPP research firm estimated global banks spent a combined $200 ''billion'' on legal fees in just four years, between 2010 and 2014. That buys quite a few chicken dinners.</ref>  


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In this way the great retrenchment of in-house legal began, and for ten years kept pace. Much low-hanging fruit was picked. But eventually, legal spend was collared, and opportunities to eek out cost dried up.  
In this way the great retrenchment of in-house legal began, and for ten years kept pace. Much low-hanging fruit was picked. But eventually, legal spend was collared, and opportunities to eek out cost dried up.  
===Digression: the dogma of cost control above all else===
Note the narrative sweep here: industrialisation. ''Scale''. ''Control''. ''Margins''. The approach to the problem of legal comes from a particular viewpoint. ''The accountant’s''. It is quantification, not evaluation, and it is focussed on one dimension alone: ''[[Cost - waste article|reducing cost]]''. The question is never what to do, or why to do it, but how cheaply to do it. The full beam of analytical, reductive rigour is trained on that single question: ''how can we do all this for less and less money''? Focus has become laser-like on the [[delivery of legal services]]. How they should be delivered, with what tools, out of which segments, at which cost.


Now management orthodoxy has understood for decades that it isn’t [[Cost - waste article|cost]], but [[waste]], that is the problem in a distributed manufacturing process: raw materials do cost money. You do have to pay machine operators. At some point you can’t avoid the basic minimum costs of doing something properly. Rather, you rigorously test your processes to check you ''are'' doing it properly — and not ''over''doing it by wasting raw materials, overengineering, having your staff standing idle or engaging them in wasteful activity. The people at Toyota were very analytical about [[Toyota Production System|the types of waste you should eliminate]] in the 1950s and 1960s, and beat the American auto-manufacturers to a pulp.
=== Digression: the dogma of cost control ''uber alles''===
Note the narrative sweep here: industrialisation. ''Scale''. ''Control''. ''Margins''. The approach to the problem of legal comes from a particular viewpoint. ''The accountant’s''.  


But when the costs are so big, it is really hard not to obsess about them, in the abstract, in the round, as a thing in themselves. Especially if you are an accountant, and you don’t understand the manufacturing process that accounts for them anyway.
It is quantification, not evaluation, and along a single dimension: ''[[Cost - waste article|reducing cost]]''. The question is never ''what'' to do, or ''why'' to do it, but ''how cheaply'' to do it. The full beam of analytical, reductive rigour is trained on that single question: ''how can we do all this for less and less money''? Hence, management’s laser-focus on the [[delivery of legal services|''delivery'' of legal services]] over the nature of the services themselves. How they should be delivered, with what tools, out of which segments, at which cost.


One last digression before we move on: Toyota’s [[lean production management]] technique works best in “tame” environments where all dependencies are mapped and all possible outcomes known. Where your environment is “[[wicked]]” — imperfect data, non-linear interactions, convex risks — you need three things that are generally designed out of production lines: expertise, flexibility, and redundancy.
Now management orthodoxy has understood for decades that it isn’t [[Cost - waste article|cost]] by itself, but [[waste|wasteful cost]], that is the problem in a distributed manufacturing process: raw materials ''do'' cost money. You ''do'' have to pay machine operators. You can’t avoid the basic minimum costs of doing something properly. Rather, you rigorously test your processes to check you ''are'' doing it properly — and not ''over''doing it by wasting materials, over-engineering, having your staff standing idle or engaging them in unnecessary activity. This was Toyota’s profound insight: through sheer analytical rigour in [[Toyota Production System|eliminating waste from its manufacturing process]] in the 1950s and 1960s, it beat the American auto-manufacturers to a pulp.


In a perfect world, [[legal eagle]]s are at their best in purely wicked environments. You consult them when things go wrong, your normal assumptions don’t work and you don’t know what to do. But in the ''actual'' world, all environments — even factories — are a mix of wicked and tame components in some portion or other. In banking, the trade-off is between product development and tail-risk management on one hand — wicked problems — and scaling and monetising products on the other — tame problems. We can assess the lawyer’s value on the tame axis quite readily, and that is largely by ''how well she can keep out of it'': how can she standardise, simplify and de-complicate business-as-usual legal processes so it requires as little explanation to the muggles as possible and to what extent can she map out predictable legal processes into decision trees and playbooks and [[operationalisation|hand them off to an operations team]] (or, at the limit, automate them) altogether.
==== Cost and waste ====
Now the thing about costs and waste is that they are not some kind of astral yin and yang, orbiting each other in a sort of stable zero-sum relationship. Some costs are worth it; some are not. Some costs are obvious; some are hard to see.  


The other, [[wicked]] part of the lawyer’s day job — one humbly submits, the ''important'' part — is a ''lot'' harder to evaluate, and is ''impossible'' to evaluate if your only prism is ''cost''.  
The easiest costs to see are ''salaries''. Salaries are big, lumpy and easily stopped: you simply dispense with those to whom you are paying them. This has passed for sport amongst finance executives for many years.


Which brings us neatly back to the question of legal operations and what is really wrong with the legal department. If you accept these premises, it will be apparent that mea None of this addresses the difficult questions the credit crisis plainly posed.
But s''tupid questions'' and ''bad ideas'' are also costs. Smaller costs, to be sure, but far more numerous, much harder for the executive suite to see, and ''really'' hard for them to stop. What the eye don’t see, the chef gets away with. 
 
Silly questions distracts not just those who ask them, but those to whom they are addressed: all who are hindered from doing more productive things. Hare-brained notions skitter around the skirting-boards of all organisations, out of sight, unchecked, by their nature creating ''more'' stupid questions and bad ideas, starting off little chain reactions of stupidity and waste. If not answered quickly and clearly, these chains sometimes ossify into policies, procedures, work-streams, teams and even [[Human resources|whole departments]].
 
Eventually, this insitutionalised, low-level vacuity creates its own invisible tide of cretinaiety, sloshing around the organisation, delaying things, pulling useful people in to its undertow, spawning its own little waves of dreck and chasing armies of little administrators chasing them down and, as they go building out yet more operational infrastructure. For all the outsourcing, offshoring and down-sizing of the last 20 years, UK financial services employment has remained largely stable.<ref>Over 21 years, and including all the branch closures, in that time, it is [https://www.statista.com/statistics/298370/uk-financial-sector-total-financial-services-employment/ down just 7.5%] </ref>
 
But when the costs are so big, it is really hard not to obsess about them, in the round, as a thing in themselves. Especially if you are an accountant, and you don’t understand the product or the manufacturing process anyway. “I ''know'',” the benighted business analyst will complain, “that cost isn’t important. But the CFO wants to see a five percent reduction. Every year.”
 
==== Wicked and tame ====
One last digression: Toyota’s [[lean production management]] technique works best in “tame” environments where all dependencies are mapped and all possible outcomes known. Where your environment is “[[Wicked problem|wicked]]” — imperfect data, non-linear interactions, [[Convexity|convex]] risks — you need three things that are generally designed ''out'' of tame production lines: [[Subject matter expert|expertise]], [[autonomy]], and [[redundancy]].
 
In the real world, all environments — even factories — are a mix of wicked and tame components. It’s a continuum. In banking, the trade-off is between product development and tail-risk management on one hand — ''wicked'' problems — and scaling and monetising products on the other — ''tame'' problems.
 
In a perfect world, [[legal eagle]]s are at their best in purely wicked environments. You consult them when things go wrong, your normal assumptions don’t work and you don’t know what to do. There are inevitably routine things every lawyer must do, but you can assess the lawyer’s real value by judging where along that tame-wicked continuum she generally sits. Evaluating her proficiency at tame problems is straightforward: how good is she at ''getting out of the way'': standardising and simplifying formerly “legal” functions into the operational business-as-usual: rendering them in need of as little explanation to [[muggle]]<nowiki/>s as possible. To what extent can she map out predictable legal processes into decision trees and playbooks and [[operationalisation|hand them off to an operations team]] (or, at the limit, automate them) altogether. If legal is stuck in the middle of routine process, approving, ticking boxes, reviewing forms that should be standard, legal is being wasteful.
 
The other, [[Wicked problem|wicked]] part of the lawyer’s day job — one humbly submits, the ''important'' part — [[Adding value|is a ''lot'' harder to evaluate]], and is ''impossible'' to evaluate if your only prism is ''cost''.
 
Which brings us neatly back to the question of what the legal department does for all that money it costs. Is there really no waste there? What is really wrong with the legal department.


==What’s ''really'' wrong with in-house legal==
==What’s ''really'' wrong with in-house legal==
Now acres of ink have been spilled, books written, monographs published, thought-pieces floated, on the problem of ''how to fix in-house legal''. [[LinkedIn]] is awash with them; all in awe of technology’s current gallop;  their mundane propositions all clothed in expressions of the richest finery. The operating theory: legal is profoundly broken, always has been, but, since we have some new ki t, [[this time is different|''this time is different'']]. We can rebuild it. We have the technology. ''We have the capability to make the world’s first bionic legal department.'' Better than it was before. Better, stronger, faster.   
Now acres of ink have been spilled, books written, monographs published, thought-pieces floated, on the problem of ''how to fix in-house legal''. [[LinkedIn]] is awash with them; all in awe of technology’s current gallop;  their mundane propositions all clothed in expressions of the richest finery.  
 
There is a common theme: legal is profoundly broken, always has been, habitually lags in any kind of innovation, but this time, now we have [[paradigm]]-shifting new technology, [[this time is different|''things are different'']]. We can rebuild it. We have the technology. ''We have the capability to make the world’s first bionic legal department.'' Better than it was before. Better, stronger, faster.   


But, friends, the problem is not technological, it isn’t new, and it doesn’t require vision. It is rather dreary and age-old. It is easy to state, if not fix:  
But, friends, the problem is not technological, it isn’t new, and it doesn’t require vision. It is rather dreary and age-old. It is easy to state, if not fix:  
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This in turn hinges on two things, neither of them soluble by [[Chatbot|chatbots]]:
This in turn hinges on two things, neither of them soluble by [[Chatbot|chatbots]]:


*'''Over-reliance on external counsel''': [[In-house lawyer|in-house lawyers]] are still far too ready to send straightforward work out. This was the original plan, to be sure, and it made sense when the bank only had three lawyers covering the whole investment bank, but times have moved on. In-house teams at investment banks are the size of middling international law firms. They skew more senior and have far more institutional experience than their private practice equivalents. They should not need to refer English law questions to outside counsel, yet still they routinely do it.<ref>It is said that Banks’ reluctance to buy [[Professional indemnity insurance|professional indemnity]] insurance for their legal teams may propel this, but this strikes me as a fatuous argument. Banks are classic self-insurers. If ever the amount of a legal call is sufficiently grave to warrant claim on a professional indemnity policy there are better questions to ask, such as ''why is a bank adopting such a risky strategy in the first place''? If that is too naive an outlook — ok, guilty as charged — then maybe ''that'' is the triage point for engaging external counsel.</ref>
*'''Over-reliance on external counsel''': [[In-house lawyer|in-house lawyers]] are still far too ready to send straightforward work out. This was the original plan, to be sure, and it made sense when the bank only had three lawyers, but times have moved on. In-house teams are the size of middling international law firms. They skew more senior and have far more institutional experience than their private practice equivalents. They should not need to refer English law questions to outside counsel, yet still they routinely do it.<ref>It is said that Banks’ reluctance to buy [[Professional indemnity insurance|professional indemnity]] insurance for their legal teams may propel this, but this strikes me as a fatuous argument. Banks are classic self-insurers. If ever the amount of a legal call is sufficiently grave to warrant claim on a professional indemnity policy there are better questions to ask, such as ''why is a bank adopting such a risky strategy in the first place''? If that is too naive an outlook — ok, guilty as charged — then maybe ''that'' is the triage point for engaging external counsel.</ref>
*'''We over-engineer legal documents''': Partly because any professional adviser is short an ugly option should anything go wrong, and partly thanks to the professional [[rent-seeker]]’s tendency towards [[Iatrogenic|iatrogenesis]], legal documents are absurdly over-engineered. They are far too incomprehensible, inscrutable and, even for those who do understand them, they are shot through with overblown protections the parties do not need and will never use, but which are nonetheless argued about and nickel-and-dimed over  for weeks of months. Even contracts that aren’t particularly high risk increasingly suffer from “[[Finance contract|banking envy]]”.
*'''We over-engineer legal documents''': Partly because any [[Professional advisers|professional adviser]] is short an ugly option should anything go wrong, and partly because all [[rent-seeker]]<nowiki/>s tend towards [[Iatrogenic|iatrogenesis]], legal documents are absurdly over-engineered. They are far too incomprehensible, inscrutable and, even for those who do understand them, they are shot through with overblown protections the parties do not need and will never use, but which are nonetheless argued about and nickel-and-dimed over  for weeks of months. Even contracts that aren’t particularly high risk increasingly suffer from “[[Finance contract|banking envy]]”.


Now it is far easier said than done, but were we to address these ''cultural'' phenomena — neither are easily solved problems to be sure, but aligning systems and incentives influences behaviour a lot more than management theory does — then much of the millenarianism we are seeing would melt away. You don’t need [[artificial intelligence]] to review your confidentiality agreements if the market agrees a [[OneNDA|short, plain, standard form]]. You don’t need document assembly if you standardise and simplify your ISDA schedules.  
Now it is far easier said than done, but were we to address these ''cultural'' phenomena — neither are easily solved problems to be sure, but aligning systems and incentives to influence behaviour a lot more than management theory does — then much of the millenarianism we are seeing would melt away. You don’t need [[artificial intelligence]] to review your [[confidentiality agreement]]<nowiki/>s if the market agrees a [[OneNDA|short, plain, standard form]]. You don’t need document assembly if you standardise and simplify your ISDA schedules.  


But these problems require an understanding of [[Behavioural economics|human psychology]] and a [[Subject matter expert|deep grasp of the legal and market conventions]] — qualities with which your average [[Master of Business Administration|MBA]] is not liberally endowed.
But these problems require an understanding of [[Behavioural economics|human psychology]] and a [[Subject matter expert|deep grasp of the legal and market conventions]] — qualities with which your average [[Master of Business Administration|MBA]] is not liberally endowed.


==What the MBAs bring to the party==
==What the MBAs bring to the party==
Now MBAs are not known for their imagination, but they do have a long suit in reductionist analytical rigour and they love an over-arching metaphorical schema.  Management consultants are keen on publishing these, and they will throw [[Microsoft PowerPoint|PowerPoint]] thought pieces around at the gentlest invitation. Lacking the [[subject matter expert]]’s deep grasp of the market, the “in-house legal problem” may be impervious to front-on attack, but they can ''analyse'' it into submission.  
Now MBAs are not known for their imagination, but they do have a long suit in reductionist analytical rigour and they do love an over-arching metaphorical schema.  Management consultants are keen on publishing these, and they will throw [[Microsoft PowerPoint|PowerPoint]] thought pieces around at the gentlest invitation. Lacking the [[subject matter expert]]’s deep grasp of the market, the “in-house legal problem” may be impervious to front-on attack, but they can ''analyse'' it into submission.  


You do this by breaking down the intractable whole into [[Legibility|legible]], familiar components that already exist in the MBA toolkit. Each becomes its own little sub-domain, with its own [[LinkedIn job descriptions|workstream lead]]-led [[workstream]], going out and gathering evidence and, basically, getting in the way of the lawyers who are busily trying to execute on their own time-worn business model.
You do this by breaking down the intractable whole into [[Legibility|legible]], familiar components that already exist in the MBA toolkit. Each becomes its own little sub-domain, with its own [[LinkedIn job descriptions|workstream lead]]-led [[workstream]], going out and gathering evidence and, basically, getting in the way of the lawyers who are busily trying to execute on their own time-worn business model.
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*[[Knowledge management]]
*[[Knowledge management]]
*Information governance
*Information governance
* Vendor management
*Vendor management
*Finance management
*Finance management
*Business intelligence
*Business intelligence