Limited recourse: Difference between revisions

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{{a|contract|}}Of a {{tag|contract}}, that the [[obligor]]’s obligations under it are limited to a defined pool of assets. You see this a lot in [[repackaging]]s, [[securitisation]]s and other structured transactions involving [[espievie]]s.
{{a|contract|
[[File:Fidgety phillip.jpg|450px|thumb|center|What happens if you do not concentrate on your debt extinction language]]
}}Of a {{tag|contract}}, that the [[obligor]]’s obligations under it are limited to a defined pool of assets. You see this a lot in [[repackaging]]s, [[securitisation]]s and other structured transactions involving [[espievie]]s. [[Security]] and [[limited recourse]] are fundamental structural aspects of contracts with [[Special purpose vehicle]]s and [[investment fund]]s.  


===In a nutshell===
===The basic idea===
[[Security]] and [[limited recourse]] are fundamental structural aspects of contracts with [[Special purpose vehicle]]s and [[investment fund]]s.  
Investment funds and structured note issuance vehivles tend to be purpose-built single corporations with no other role in life. They issue shares or units to investors and with the proceeds, buy securities, make investments and enter swaps, loans and other transactions with their brokers. The brokers will generally be [[Capital structure|structurally senior]] to the fund’s investors (either as unsecured [[creditor]]s, where the investors are [[Shareholder|shareholders]], or as higher-ranking secured creditors, where the investors are also [[secured creditor|secured creditors]]).  


'''[[Security interest|Secured]], [[limited recourse]] to [[repackaging|multi-issuancevehicles]]''': In the world of multi-issuance repackaging [[SPV]]s, secured limited recourse obligations are ''de rigueur''. They save the cost of creating thousands of new vehicles, and really only do by [[contract]] what establishing a brand new [[espievie]] for each deal would do through the exigencies of coporastion law and the [[corporate veil]]. There is a ''quid pro quo'': noteholders agree to limit their claims to the liquidated value of the assets underlying that specific deal, but in return, the issuer creates a fist-ranking security over those assets, stopping any interloper happening by and getting its mitts on them. Over the years the technology has been refined, standardised, and it plays little part in the life of a modern-day structured finance counsel, though, at his mother’s knee, he might once have been told fairy stories about what became of poor Fidgety Phillip when he carelessly put “extinction” rather than “no debt due” in on his way home from school and burned to death.<ref>Come to think of it he may have forgotten to file a [[Slavenburg]].</ref>
So the main reason for limiting the [[broker]]’s recourse to the [[SPV]]’s assets is not to prevent the broker being paid what it is owed. It is to stop the [[SPV]] going into formal bankruptcy procedures ''once all its assets have been liquidated and distributed [[pari passu]] to creditors''. At this point, there is nothjing left to pay anyone, so it is academic.


'''Limiting recourse to the funds entire pool of assets''': A provision which says "once all the fund’s assets are gone, you can’t put it into bankruptcy, is essentially harmless, seeing as once all the fund’s assets are gone there’s no ''point'' putting it into bankruptcy. So, if you are feeling especially ornery, and have the urge to challenge these provisions, do yourself and everyone else on the deal a favour: don’t.  
Now, why would a [[broker]] want to put an empty [[SPV]] — one which has already handed over all its worldly goods to its creditors — into liquidation? Search me. Why, on the other hand, would the directors of that empty [[SPV]], bereft as it is of worldly goods, be anxious for it ''not'' to go into liquidation? Because their livelihoods depend on it: being directors of a bankrupt company opens them to allegations or reckless trading, which may bar them from acting as directors in their jurisdiction. Since that’s their day job, it’s a bummer.  


'''Limiting recourse to assets managed by an agent''': On the other hand, imiting recourse to a pool of assets managed by a single agent or investment manager — being a ''subset'' of toe total number of assets owned by the fund — is a different story altogether. This, by sleept market convention, has become a fairly standard feature of the market, but to the [[JC]] and his friends and relations, seems ''batshit insane''.
But haven’t they been, like, reckless trading? No. Remember, we are in the [[parallel universe]] of [[SPV]]s. Unlike normal commercial undertakings, [[SPV]]s run on autopilot. They are designed to give exposure, exactly, to the pools of assets and liabilities they hold. That’s the deal. Everyone trades with [[SPV]]s on that understanding.  The directors are really nominal figures: they outsource executive and trading decisions to an [[investment manager]]. Their main job is to ensure accounts are prepared and a return filed each year. They are not responsible for the trading strategy that drove the [[espievie]] into the wall.<ref>The [[investment manager]] is. So should ''she'' be barred from managing assets? THIS IS NOT THE TIME OR THE PLACE TO DISCUSS.</ref>


===Limited recourse and [[investment fund]]s===
So all an [[investment fund]]’s [[limited recourse]] clause really needs to say is:
Investment funds tend to be single corporations which and issue shares or units to investors and use the issue proceeds to buy securities investments and enter swaps, loans and other transactions with brokers. Here the brokers, being creditors, are [[Capital structure|structurally senior]] to the fund’s investors, who rank as [[Shareholder|equityholder]]s. So the main reason for limiting the [[broker]]’s recourse to the [[SPV]]’s assets is to stop the [[broker]] putting the [[SPV]] into formal bankruptcy procedures ''once all its assets have been liquidated and distributed [[pari passu]] to creditors''.


Now, why would a [[broker]] want to put an empty [[SPV]] — one which has already handed over all its worldly goods — into liquidation? Search me. Why, on the other hand, would the directors of that empty [[SPV]], bereft as it is of worldly goods, be anxious for it ''not'' to go into liquidation? Because their livelihoods depend on it: being directors of a bankrupt company opens them to allegations or reckless trading, which may bar them from acting as directors in their jurisdiction. Since that’s their day job, it’s a bummer.  
:''Our recourse against the Fund will be limited to its assets, rights and claims. Once they have been finally realised and their net proceeds applied under the agreement, the Fund will owe us no further debt and we may not take any further steps against it to recover any further sum.''


But haven’t they been, like, reckless trading? No. Remember, we are in the [[parallel universe]] of [[SPV]]s. Unlike normal commercial undertakings, [[SPV]]s run on autopilot. They are designed to give exposure, exactly, to the pools of assets and liabilities they hold. That’s the deal. Everyone trades with [[SPV]]s on that understanding.  
But, as we shall see, sometimes [[asset manager]]s can be a malign influence, and try to further limit this.


The directors are really nominal figures: they outsource executive and trading decisions to an [[investment manager]]. Their main job is to ensure accounts are prepared and a return filed each year. They are not responsible for the trading strategy that drobve the [[espievie]] into the wall.<ref>The [[investment manager]] is. So should ''she'' be barred from managing assets? THIS IS NOT THE TIME OR THE PLACE TO DISCUSS.</ref>
===Variations===
So there are different varieties of limited recourse; some more fearsome than others:


So all an [[investment fund]]’s [[limited recourse]] clause really needs to say is:
===Multi-issuance [[repackaging]] vehicles: secured, limited recourse===
In the world of multi-issuance [[repackaging]] [[SPV]]s, [[secured, limited recourse obligation|secured limited recourse]] obligations are ''de rigueur''. They save the cost of creating a whole new vehicle for each trade, and really only do by [[contract]] what establishing a brand new [[espievie]] for each deal would do through the exigencies of corporation law and the [[corporate veil]].  That said, with [[Segregated portfolio company|segregated cell companies]], you can more or less do this, through the exigencies of the corporate veil, inside a single [[espievie]]. But I digress.
 
With [[secured, limited recourse obligation]]s there is a ''quid pro quo'': creditors agree to limit their claims to the liquidated value of the secured assets underlying the deal (usually a [[par asset swap]] package), but in return, the issuer grants a first-ranking security over those assets in favour of the creditors, stopping any interloper happening by and getting its mitts on them. 
 
Over the years the secured, limited recourse technology has been refined and standardised, and now plays little part in the education of a modern-day structured finance lawyer, though, at his mother’s knee, he might once have been told fairy stories about what became of poor Fidgety Phillip when he carelessly put “extinction” rather than “no debt due” in a pricing supplement on his way home from school and burned to death.<ref>Come to think of it he may have forgotten to file a [[Slavenburg]].</ref>
 
===General limited recourse for investment funds===
Where you are facing an investment fund held by equity investors it is slightly — but not very — different. Generally, there is no security, since there’s no question of [[ring-fencing]] separate pools of assets. (But investment managers can get in the way and steal options, so be on your guard — see below).
'''Limiting recourse to the fund’s entire pool of assets''': A provision which says “once all the fund’s assets are gone, you can’t put it into bankruptcy”, is essentially harmless, seeing as once all the fund’s assets are gone there’s no ''point'' putting it into bankruptcy. This is the same place you would be with a single-issue [[repackaging]] vehicle: the [[corporate veil]] does the work anyway.
 
==='''Limiting recourse to assets managed by an agent'''=== On the other hand, limiting recourse to a pool of assets ''within'' a single fund legal entity — say to those managed by a single [[investment manager]]  (some funds subcontract out management of their portfolios to multiple asset managers) — being a ''subset'' of the total number of assets owned by the fund — is a different story altogether.  This, by sleepy market convention, has become a standard part of the furniture, but to the [[JC]] and his friends and relations, seems ''batshit insane''.
 
So firstly, the investment manager is an [[agent]]. An [[agent]] isn’t liable ''at all'' for ''any'' of its [[principal]]s’ obligations. It is a mere [[intermediary]]: the [[JC]] have waxed long and hard enough about that elsewhere; suffice to say the concept of [[agency]] is one of those things we feel [[Legal concepts all bankers should know|''everyone'' in financial services should know]]; this is not one to drop-kick to your [[legal eagle]]s: it is fundamental to the workings of all finance.


:''Our recourse against the Fund will be limited to its assets, rights and claims. Once they have been finally realised and their net proceeds applied under the agreement, the Fund will owe us no further debt and we may not take any further steps against it to recover any further sum.''
So why would an agent seek to limit its principal’s liability to the particular pool of assets that principal has allocated to that agent?


===Limited recourse in [[repackaging]]s and for [[SPV]]s with contractually segregated pools===
If the [[SPV]] has got segregated compartments in it (that is, it is issuing multiple series of securities), the limitation of a claim — what we said above for the [[investment fund]]s goes hand-in-hand with a [[security interest]] over the defined pool of assets. This is to secure, and limit, the broker’s claim to the specific pool with which it is trading, leaving all the other pools unmolested should one drive itself into the wall, but keeping all claimants of those other pools away from this one too.


===[[Limited recourse]] formulations===
===[[Limited recourse]] formulations===