No One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller: Difference between revisions

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 That is remarkable enough a story, and Mr. Markopolos deserves your money to tell his story for that service alone.
-While we might shake our heads in wonder, we also might harbour some suspicions: Markopolos was from an unfashionable firm based in unfashionable Boston under the jurisdiction of the unfashionable Boston branch of the [[SEC]]; he seems an unfashionable chap, prone to unfashionable conspiracy theory: none of this can have helped his credibility. But neither that nor the fact that the [[SEC]] is under-staffed, under-skilled or over-populated with financially illiterate lawyers comes ''close'' to explaining why Markopolos’ warnings were systematically ignored. If you read Markopolos’ submission to the SEC from 2005 — see the footnotes below — you will see that one didn’t need to be an expert on option split-strike conversion strategies to realise something must have been dreadfully wrong with Madoff’s operation.
+While we might shake our heads in wonder, we also might harbour some suspicions: Markopolos was an unfashionable chap from an unfashionable firm based in unfashionable Boston under the jurisdiction of the unfashionable Boston branch of the [[SEC]]: none of this can have helped his credibility. But neither that, nor the fact that the [[SEC]] was under-staffed, under-skilled or over-populated with financially illiterate lawyers, comes ''close'' to explaining why Markopolos’ warnings were systematically ignored. If you read Markopolos’ submission to the SEC from 2005 — see the footnotes below — you will see that one didn’t need to be an expert on option split-strike conversion strategies to realise something must have been dreadfully wrong with Madoff’s operation.
 Yet while these shortcomings are not good answers, they are the best Markopolos can offer (or be expected to). For all his studied outrage (if ever there were a dictionary definition of “studied outrage” this is it) throughout this entertaining and readable book, Markopolos is happy to accept that this is just a case of good, old-fashioned, incompetence. The system itself is O.K.; it’s just that significant parts of it (such as the [[SEC]]) happened to be asleep at the switch. Hire a few more analysts, fire a few lawyers, and all will be well.