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Policy: Difference between revisions
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Hypothesis: where t[[here be dragons]], a policy is your worst enemy. | Hypothesis: where t[[here be dragons]], a policy is your worst enemy. | ||
We are all familiar with the ghastly tale of Grenfell Tower and the now infamous | We are all familiar with the ghastly tale of Grenfell Tower and the now infamous “stay put policy”. | ||
The British Standard Code of Practice of 1962 introduced the first national standard requiring tall residential blocks to provide one hour’s fire resistance so firefighters could fight flames inside the building. Each flat would act as an individual “compartment” containing any fire for at least an hour. This would enable firefighters to put out one fire in one flat rather than face a whole building ablaze.To work, the building must be able to withstand the spread of flames beyond compartments, and there must be clear access so affected residents can escape and firefighters can get in quickly. Part of ensuring that clear access involved discouraging ''un''affected residents to evacuate, exposing them to risk of smoke, clogging up the firefighters’ access or impeding affected residents’ exit. Opening doors of other flats was expected to undermine the “compartmentalisation”. In 57,000 high-rise fires between 2010 and 2017 only 216 (0.4%) required more than five residents to evacuate. It was a policy that worked in tens of thousands of fires over sixty years with minimal casualties. The Grenfell report describes the policy — unsurprisingly — as an “article of faith” within the London Fire Brigade “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”. | The British Standard Code of Practice of 1962 introduced the first national standard requiring tall residential blocks to provide one hour’s fire resistance so firefighters could fight flames inside the building. Each flat would act as an individual “compartment” containing any fire for at least an hour. This would enable firefighters to put out one fire in one flat rather than face a whole building ablaze.To work, the building must be able to withstand the spread of flames beyond compartments, and there must be clear access so affected residents can escape and firefighters can get in quickly. Part of ensuring that clear access involved discouraging ''un''affected residents to evacuate, exposing them to risk of smoke, clogging up the firefighters’ access or impeding affected residents’ exit. Opening doors of other flats was expected to undermine the “compartmentalisation”. In 57,000 high-rise fires between 2010 and 2017 only 216 (0.4%) required more than five residents to evacuate. It was a policy that worked in tens of thousands of fires over sixty years with minimal casualties. The Grenfell report describes the policy — unsurprisingly — as an “article of faith” within the London Fire Brigade “so powerful that to depart from it was to all intents and purposes unthinkable”. | ||
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The point here is not to defend the fire service, but identify what is happening. The fire service is facing a new, unexpected situation. They are unexpectedly at a frontier, whereas they expected to be on a production line. They are armed with a policy designed for the production line. | The point here is not to defend the fire service, but identify what is happening. The fire service is facing a new, unexpected situation. They are unexpectedly at a frontier, whereas they expected to be on a production line. They are armed with a policy designed for the production line. | ||
{{draft}} | {{draft}} | ||
{{ | {{sa}} | ||
*[[doctrine of precedent]] | *[[doctrine of precedent]] | ||
*[[elephants and turtles]] | *[[elephants and turtles]] | ||