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Prisoner’s dilemma: Difference between revisions
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{{a| | {{a|bi|{{prisonersdilemmatable}}}}The [[prisoner’s dilemma]] is the mathematician’s way of articulating the [[commercial imperative]]. | ||
An exercise in calculating economic outcomes by means of {{tag|metaphor}}, the [[prisoner’s dilemma]] was developed at the RAND corporation in the 1950s by those splendid brainboxes as a way of predicting individuals’ behaviour in situations requiring [[I believe|trust]] among strangers - for very good example, when unacquainted participants buy or sell in an unregulated market. This field developed into [[game theory]]. | An exercise in calculating economic outcomes by means of {{tag|metaphor}}, the [[prisoner’s dilemma]] was developed at the RAND corporation in the 1950s by those splendid brainboxes as a way of predicting individuals’ behaviour in situations requiring [[I believe|trust]] among strangers - for very good example, when unacquainted participants buy or sell in an unregulated market. This field developed into [[game theory]]. | ||
==The original prisoner’s dilemma== | |||
Two people are charged with a conspiracy<ref>Whether or not they are guilty is beside the point. If it helps you empathise with their predicament, assume they’re innocent</ref>. Each is held separately. They cannot communicate. There is enough evidence to convict both on a lesser charge, but not the main charge. Each prisoner is separately offered the same plea bargain. The offer is: | Two people are charged with a conspiracy<ref>Whether or not they are guilty is beside the point. If it helps you empathise with their predicament, assume they’re innocent</ref>. Each is held separately. They cannot communicate. There is enough evidence to convict both on a lesser charge, but not the main charge. Each prisoner is separately offered the same plea bargain. The offer is: | ||
*If A informs B but B refuses to inform on A: | *If A informs B but B refuses to inform on A: | ||
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**A will get 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge). | **A will get 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge). | ||
**B will get 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge). | **B will get 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge). | ||
Another way of looking at this, for those easily triggered, is as the [[eBayer’s dilemma]]. | Another way of looking at this, for those easily triggered, is as the [[eBayer’s dilemma]]. | ||
===Single round prisoner’s dilemma=== | ===[[Single round prisoner’s dilemma]]=== | ||
If you play the game once, and in isolation — with someone you don’t know and whom you do not expect to meet again, the payoff is grim: those who cooperate will get ''reamed''. Cooperation is a bad strategy. Your best interest is in defecting on the other guy, because ''his'' best interest is defecting on ''you''. | If you play the game once, and in isolation — with someone you don’t know and whom you do not expect to meet again, the payoff is grim: those who cooperate will get ''reamed''. Cooperation is a bad strategy. Your best interest is in defecting on the other guy, because ''his'' best interest is defecting on ''you''. | ||
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Now, as well as the short-term payoff, there is a longer-term payoff, and it ''dwarfs'' the short term payoff. If I defect once, I earn £150. If I cooperate a thousand times, I earn £50,000. If I defect first time round, sure: I am £100 up, but at what cost: if my counterparty refuses to play with me again — and if she tells other players in the market — I will struggle to make much money. ''No one will trust me''. | Now, as well as the short-term payoff, there is a longer-term payoff, and it ''dwarfs'' the short term payoff. If I defect once, I earn £150. If I cooperate a thousand times, I earn £50,000. If I defect first time round, sure: I am £100 up, but at what cost: if my counterparty refuses to play with me again — and if she tells other players in the market — I will struggle to make much money. ''No one will trust me''. | ||
{{ | ===''One prisoner, or ''two''?=== | ||
In our view, one correctly places the apostrophe to designate a ''single'' prisoner having the dilemma — so [[prisoner’s dilemma]], not ''prisoners’'' dilemma — because both prisoners if taken together ''have'' no dilemma: it is only where they are acting individually that they have a problem ... ''with each other''. | |||
{{sa}} | |||
*The [[tragedy of the commons]] | |||
*[[Agency problem]] | *[[Agency problem]] | ||
*[[I believe]] | *[[I believe]] | ||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} | ||
{{draft}} | {{draft}} | ||