Risk taxonomy: Difference between revisions

===The problem with risk taxonomies===

{{JC}} has ''two'' reservations about risk taxonomies:

Any [[taxonomy]], like a map, can only document the territory you ''know'', have raked over, surveyed and measured. ''Stables from which the horse has bolted'', so to say. This is of a piece with the [[Mediocre lawyer|common lawyer]]’s usual mode of reasoning, the [[doctrine of precedent]], whose organising principle is to move ''forward'' by exclusive reference to what lies ''behind''. This is all very well in times of plenty, when the tide is rising, all boats are floating, those swimming nude are safely concealed from the neck down and all is well in the world. Here, the world behaves according to the narrative we have supplied it — we are in a period of “[[normal science]]”<ref>{{Author|Thomas Kuhn}}, {{br|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}. If you take ''one'' book recommendation from the {{tag|JC}}, make it this one. Or {{br|The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind}}.</ref>. But by the same token, the acute risks are in abeyance. Aslan is ''not'' on the move. Even if you left the door open, the horse has a nosebag full of hay and is’t going anywhere.

But what happens when our carefully constructed narrative falls apart? Those stressed scenarios in which, as the old saw has it, {{maxim|I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone}}, and [[black swan]]s will be angrily flapping about. Then, your [[paradigm]] has failed. People around you are losing their heads and blaming it on you and your stupid [[taxonomy]], ''which suddenly isn’t working''.  

====It’s a [[narrative]]====

*[[Black swan]]

*[[Doctrine of precedent]]

{{ref}}