Rumpelheimer v Haddock: Difference between revisions

Agam, it was argued for the plaintiff that, since the highroad was only covered with water by an exceptional inundation of short duration, it cannot be held to have lost the character of a highroad. But to accept this view would be to admit a very dangerous and confusing precedent. Suppose that large sections of our southern counties were covered for a long period by exceptional floods, so that the inhabitants were compelled to cross them regularly in steam- or motor-vessels, can it be doubted that the regulations of the water, as to the avoidance of collisions, the carrying of lights, sound signals in case of fog, and so forth, would be observed and enforced in that area? Yet in principle the two cases are the same, and differences of degree cannot be allowed to derogate from principle. The fact that a certain area of water was once dry land and is expected to be dry land again is unimportant. Much of what we now know as land was once covered by the ocean, and ''vice versa,'' but a motorist would not be allowed to appeal to the customs of the sea because he was crossing the Romney Marshes, on the ground that that land used to be sea. In the same way it is idle for the plaintiff to urge that Chiswick Mall used to be dry land. The question in every case must be a question of fact — Was this area at the material dates water or dry land? And neither geographical size nor extent of time is a relevant consideration We find in this case that the scene of the mishap was water, and tidal water. Now, tidal waters lead to the ocean and are navigated by the vessels of every maritime country. The regulations upon which Mr Haddock relies are not of British origin or sanction only; they govern the movements and secure the safety of the ships of the world. The nations rely upon each other to observe them faithfully and defend them jealously. It will be easily seen what international complications might ensue if it were to go forth that the Admiralty Court of Great Britain was prepared to play fast and loose with them for the benefit of a motorist, however small the issues at stake. The defendant is no gentleman, but that is neither here nor there. We find for the defendant, much as we dislike him.

 

NOTE—See Bracton “''Lex non risu deletur''” or “Ridicule will not repeal”, or (Lord Mildew in ''The Dukeries Case'') “A man may laugh at the law, but the law will laugh last”. See Rex v Flanagan (I9I9) 2 AC, in which the wife of a plumber died intestate leaving issue three children and net personalty £31,482. A charge of murder was preferred against the plumber, who raised the defence that, man and wife being at Common Law one person, it could not be murder to kill his wife. The plea was allowed, and a verdict of “Suicide while of unsound mmd” was returned, but it was held (Mould, L J , dissenting) that, being insane, the man was ineligible for unemployment relief See also ''Earl of Erne v Maltravers and Gareth'' (1893, 2 HL ), where the Yaffle hounds hunted an aged peer for four miles over the property of the plaintiff, who had forbidden the Hunt to cross his boundaries. In an action for trespass it was held (Fruit, LJ, dissenting) that though the Master had been guilty of negligence in employing short-sighted foxhounds their pursuit of Lord Gareth was an Act of God which he could not have foreseen or prevented. On appeal, however, the House of Lords decided that, though not responsible for damage done by the dogs, he must make good that which was due to the passage of himself and his horse, and the case was referred to assessors for apportionment ''quantum pertinent''. Later, on a writ of ''quo corpore'' (''Rex v Maltravers''), the Master was found guilty of constructive assault in venery, and went bankrupt. (And see Wedderburn on Water-courses).