Rye v Rye: Difference between revisions

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{{a|casenote|}}{{cite|Rye|Rye|1962|AC|496}} stands as [[common law]] authority — from [[Lord Denning]], no less — for the proposition that a man cannot grant himself a lease, but even more compelling testimony to the unlimited caprice of the English litigant.  
{{a|casenote|}}{{cite|Rye|Rye|1962|AC|496}} stands as [[common law]] authority — from [[Lord Denning]], no less — for the proposition that “one cannot grant oneself a lease”, but is even more compelling testimony to the unlimited caprice of the English litigant.  


For what kind of fellow would get into an argument with himself of sufficient feist as to bring formal legal proceedings against himself let alone, upon losing them, to appeal it, all the way to the House of Lords? This is a feat of [[Albert Haddock|Haddock]]ian proportions.
For what kind of fellow would get into an argument with himself of sufficient feist as to bring formal legal proceedings against himself let alone, upon losing them, to ''appeal'' it, all the way to the House of Lords? This is a feat of [[Albert Haddock|Haddock]]ian proportions. There is a certain kind of fellow who can start a fight in an empty house, as we all know. but when the fight is as to the ontological nature of one’s occupancy of that property, that is a whole other thing.


A sanguine explanation is no doubt to be found in the 1962 volume of the Appeals Cases and being, as it was, penned by a giant of modern jurisprudence and a man of no small literary talent, would doubtless repay reading, but  — inasmuch as it would displace the mental image I currently have, of a man pursuing himself to the highest tribunal in the land to contest his right to occupy his own house — it would still rank as a disappointment, so I do not propose to find out what that explanation is, and would thank anyone who does happen to know, to keep it to themselves.
A sanguine explanation is no doubt to be found in the 1962 volume of the Appeals Cases and being, as it was, penned by a giant of modern jurisprudence and a man of no small literary talent, would doubtless repay reading, but  — inasmuch as it would displace the mental image I currently have, of a man pursuing himself to the highest tribunal in the land to contest his right to occupy his own house — it would still rank as a disappointment, so I do not propose to find out what that explanation is, and would thank anyone who does happen to know, to keep it to themselves.