Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions: Difference between revisions

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It would be similarly perverse, Dame Marjorie reasons, if, in the heart of the very same city, a man could not exercise a licence without being arrested. I find force in this submission.
It would be similarly perverse, Dame Marjorie reasons, if, in the heart of the very same city, a man could not exercise a licence without being arrested. I find force in this submission.
====Respondent’s submissions====
====Respondent’s submissions====
Sir Anthony Clunge organised his principle around the principle of equivocality. A licence granted, as this one must be, by conduct requires a clarity of conduct such that a prudent bystander could be under no misapprehension as to the complainants’ intentions.
Sir Anthony Clunge organised his principle around the principle of what he calls “unequivocality”. A licence such as this granted by action requires a clarity of conduct such that a prudent bystander could not misunderstand the complainants’ intent.


Sir Anthony argues that the complainants’ behaviour could be hardly further from the model of clarity the common law requires to construe such a delegation of entitlements without explicit written or spoken word.
Sir Anthony argues that the complainants’ behaviour did not could attain the clarity the common law requires. It could hardly have been further from it. Ms. Bott’s oration, he contends, was little short of baffling: a confused assemblage of illogicalities, sophistries, begged questions, miscued rhetoricals and conclusions not even hinted at by their premises. One could not with safety know that Ms Bott understood herself.
 
In the alternative, Sir Anthony says that should a licence be inferred it was smartly revoked.
 
But this argument cannot stand; the nature of the licence, illustrated by their own behaviour, wear irrevocable.
===Judgment===
===Judgment===
The appellant’s proposition is that, having loudly announced their stance, the complainants are not well positioned to object should someone else follow it. What is soup for a goose is soup for a gander, so to speak. By their own actions, the complainants licensed those who found them irritating to cover them in soup.
The appellant’s proposition is that, having loudly announced their stance, the complainants are not well positioned to object should someone else follow it. What is soup for a goose is soup for a gander, so to speak. By their own actions, the complainants licensed those who found them irritating to cover them in soup.