Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions: Difference between revisions

Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions (view source)

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 It would be similarly perverse, Dame Marjorie reasons, if, in the heart of the very same city, a man could not exercise a licence without being arrested. I find force in this submission.
 ====Respondent’s submissions====
-Sir Anthony Clunge organised his principle around the principle of what he calls “unequivocality”. A licence such as this granted by action requires a clarity of conduct such that a prudent bystander could not misunderstand the complainants’ intent.
 Sir Anthony argues that the complainants’ behaviour did not could attain the clarity the common law requires. To the contrary, he says, it hardly could be further from it.
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 And Ms. Bott’s cloth-headed oration, he contends, was  nowhere near. It was little short of baffling: a confused assemblage of illogicalities, sophistries, begged questions, trite slogans, miscued rhetoricals and conclusions not even hinted at by their premises. One could not with safety know that Ms Bott understood herself.
-What do you make of someone whose teeshirt says “No” to oil, but who complains about the cost of energy? Who demonstrates about  hunger by tipping out soup?
+What do you make of someone whose tee-shirt says “No” to oil, but who carries on to decry the cost of energy? What kind of moron demonstrates about  hunger by tipping away soup?
-Ms Bott was crying out for help, not a face-ful of soup.
+Ms Bott was crying out for professional help, Sir Anthony says, and not a face-ful of soup.
-In the alternative, Sir Anthony says that should a licence be inferred it was smartly revoked.
+Sir Anthony closed his submissions rather ingeniously. He invoked a principle of his own invention which he calls “unequivocality”. A [[licence]] such as this, granted by deed rather than compact, requires a clarity of conduct such that a prudent bystander could not misunderstand the complainants’ intent. Sir Anthony invites us to call to mind the “officious bystander” who first assisted the common law as long ago as 1939.<ref>{{cite|Southern Foundries| Shirlaw|1939|2 KB|206}}</ref> Somewhat presumptuously paraphrasing MacKinnon LJ, Sir Anthony suggested:
+{{Quote|
+The statement inferred requires conduct so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the complainants were ensouping the picture and heckling passers by, an officious bystander were to explain what with her conduct the complainant was inviting, they would testily suppress him with a common “Oh, of course!”.}}
-But this argument cannot stand; the nature of the licence, illustrated by their own behaviour, wear irrevocable.
 ===Judgment===
 The appellant’s proposition is that, having loudly announced their stance, the complainants are not well positioned to object should someone else follow it. What is soup for a goose is soup for a gander, so to speak. By their own actions, the complainants licensed those who found them irritating to cover them in soup.