Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions: Difference between revisions

Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions (view source)

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 {{quote|{{smallcaps|Appeal}} against the conviction of [[Ernest Shubtill]], the appellant, for the assault with an edible weapon of [[Violet Elizabeth Botts]]. The appellant was convicted on 17 October 2022, at the London & Middx Assizes.}}
-''Contract — Licence — Implied Licence — Whether existence of Implied Licence operates as justification for assault — Criminal Justice Act 1983''
+''Contract — Licence — Implied Licence — Whether existence of Implied Licence operates as justification for assault — Criminal Justice Act 1983 —  Reasonableness — [[Officious bystander]] — Objectivity of test — Inherent subjectivity of objectivity''
 Dame Marjorie Wrigley, K.C. for the appellant <br>
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 It would be similarly perverse, Dame Marjorie reasons, if, in the heart of the very same city, a man could not exercise a licence without being arrested. I find force in this submission.
 ====Respondent’s submissions====
-Sir Anthony opened brightly for the respondent, arguing that the complainants’ behaviour did not attain the clarity the common law requires to construe a licence. To the contrary, he says, it hardly could be further from it.
+Sir Anthony opened brightly for the respondent, arguing that the complainants’ behaviour did not attain the clarity the [[common law]] requires to construe a licence. To the contrary, he says, it hardly could be further from it.
 We should not expect citizens to conduct their relations with the world in careful syllogisms: Sir Anthony concedes this would be too much. We agree: polite society lubricates its gears with subtle gestures. Nods, winks and waggled heads are quite enough to covey assent. The appellant knows this well. <Ref>{{Cite|Shubtill|Finchley Port Authority}}</ref>
-But nor, Says Sir Anthony should we impute an invitation to make ostensive mess of one’ person lightly. The common law expects citizens to approach with reason and clean hands; it doesn't say
+We should not, Sir Anthony urges, lightly impute an open invitation to make mess of on a citizen just because that citizen is aggravating. The common law has long expected citizens to approach it [[Reasonable|reasonably]] and having washed their hands; it does not require them, beyond that, not to be tiresome. The mythical reasonable man is naturally a bore.<ref>{{Cite|Fardell|Potts}}. The court agrees. We find as fact the complainants ''were'' annoying, and as law that it makes no difference: they are entitled to civil protection.
- There must be a basic sense of coherence to raise a presumption.
-And Ms. Bott’s cloth-headed oration, he contends, was  nowhere near. It was little short of baffling: a confused assemblage of illogicalities, sophistries, begged questions, trite slogans, miscued rhetoricals and conclusions not even hinted at by their premises. One could not with safety know that Ms Bott understood herself.
+The appellants must, therefore, do enough to raise a basic sense of ''coherence'' to the the complainants’ contact as to at least raise the presumption of a licence.
-What do you make of someone whose tee-shirt says “No” to oil, but who carries on to decry the cost of energy? What kind of moron demonstrates about  hunger by tipping away soup?
+And Ms. Bott’s cloth-headed oration, he contends, was nowhere near coherent. It was little short of baffling: a confused assemblage of illogicalities, sophistries, begged questions, trite slogans, miscued rhetoricals and conclusions not even hinted at by their premises. One could not with safety say that [[Violet Elizabeth Bott|Ms Bott]] understood herself.
-Ms Bott was crying out for professional help, Sir Anthony says, and not a face-ful of soup.
+“What,” asks Sir Anthony, “is one make of someone whose tee-shirt says “Just Stop Oil”, but who carries on to decry the cost of energy? What kind of moron demonstrates about hunger,” he continues, “by tipping away soup? Ms. Bott’s behaviour was a cry for professional help, not for a face-ful of soup.”
-Sir Anthony closed his submissions rather ingeniously. He invoked a principle of his own invention which he calls “unequivocality”. A [[licence]] such as this, granted by deed rather than compact, requires a clarity of conduct such that a prudent bystander could not misunderstand the complainants’ intent. Sir Anthony invites us to call to mind the “officious bystander” who first assisted the common law as long ago as 1939.<ref>{{cite|Southern Foundries| Shirlaw|1939|2 KB|206}}</ref> Somewhat presumptuously paraphrasing MacKinnon LJ, Sir Anthony suggested:
+We were much persuaded by this line. Sir Anthony closed his submissions rather ingeniously. He invoked a principle of his own invention which he calls “unequivocality”. A [[licence]] such as this, granted by deed rather than compact, requires a clarity of conduct such that a prudent bystander could not misunderstand the complainants’ intent. Sir Anthony invites us to call to mind the “officious bystander” who first assisted the common law as long ago as 1939.<ref>{{cite|Southern Foundries| Shirlaw|1939|2 KB|206}}</ref> Somewhat presumptuously paraphrasing MacKinnon LJ, Sir Anthony suggested:
 {{Quote|
 The statement inferred requires conduct so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the complainants were ensouping the picture and heckling passers by, an officious bystander were to explain what with her conduct the complainant was inviting, they would testily suppress him with a common “Oh, of course!”.}}