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Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions: Difference between revisions
Shubtill v Director of Public Prosecutions (view source)
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First, there must be an “assault”. | First, there must be an “assault”. | ||
A person commits an assault if he performs an act (and not a mere omission) by which she [[Intention|intentionally]] or [[Degrees of liability|recklessly]] causes another to apprehend immediate | A person commits an assault if he performs an act (and not a mere omission) by which she [[Intention|intentionally]] or [[Degrees of liability|recklessly]] causes another to apprehend immediate unlawful violence. | ||
Secondly, she must do so with an “edible weapon”. | Secondly, she must do so with an “edible weapon”. | ||
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Throughout the episode, the complainants struck a ''self-righteous'' tone. (There is little doubt that is so: it carried on in their evidence before the lower court, which Ms. [[Violet Elizabeth Bott|Bott]] delivered with the same stridency as she had her lecture at the Gallery.) Dame Marjorie contends the complainants’ evident willingness to self-righteously pour soup on much-loved public artworks, without permission, can be generalised to their own view that “''one may freely pour soup on, or glue things to, things one finds irritating''”. | Throughout the episode, the complainants struck a ''self-righteous'' tone. (There is little doubt that is so: it carried on in their evidence before the lower court, which Ms. [[Violet Elizabeth Bott|Bott]] delivered with the same stridency as she had her lecture at the Gallery.) Dame Marjorie contends the complainants’ evident willingness to self-righteously pour soup on much-loved public artworks, without permission, can be generalised to their own view that “''one may freely pour soup on, or glue things to, things one finds irritating''”. | ||
Indeed, contends Dame Marjorie, we may impute the attitude that one may do this without the owner’s consent, and even notwithstanding a binding contractual obligation, set out on a ticket or terms of admission, to ''not'' do such a thing. The complainants’ behaviour, Dame Marjorie says, conveyed their personal conviction that such ''behaviour is acceptable and appropriate'', such that they cannot now complain if others indulge | Indeed, contends Dame Marjorie, we may impute the attitude that one may do this without the owner’s consent, and even notwithstanding a binding contractual obligation, set out on a ticket or terms of admission, to ''not'' do such a thing. The complainants’ behaviour, Dame Marjorie says, conveyed their personal conviction that such ''behaviour is acceptable and appropriate'', such that they cannot now complain if others indulge in it. | ||
The | The complainants, that is, ''licenced'' the appellant to behave as he did. | ||
Now it is an ancient principle of natural justice that ''[[nemo dat quod non habet]]'': one cannot give what one does not have. The complainants could not have granted such a licence to damage others’ property: only their own. | Now it is an ancient principle of natural justice that ''[[nemo dat quod non habet]]'': one cannot give what one does not have. The complainants could not have granted such a licence to damage others’ property: only their own. | ||