Template:Assignment and assumption capsule: Difference between revisions

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This is a lovely, imaginative solution to a technical tax risk.<ref>Namely, that terminating the existing transaction would realise a taxable profit.</ref> It is bold, elegant, endlessly fascinating and superficially attractive — rather like one of those [[Penrose triangle]]s. Like a [[Penrose triangle]], you can easily commit it to paper, and it pleases the easily gulled. Also like a [[Penrose triangle]], it is conceptually impossible and cannot work.
This is a lovely, imaginative solution to a technical tax risk.<ref>Namely, that terminating the existing transaction would realise a taxable profit.</ref> It is bold, elegant, endlessly fascinating and superficially attractive — rather like one of those [[Penrose triangle]]s. Like a [[Penrose triangle]], you can easily commit it to paper, and it pleases the easily gulled. Also like a [[Penrose triangle]], it is conceptually impossible and cannot work.


Perhaps the “duck rabbit” is the better philosophical metaphor. You call it a “rabbit”, but it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, and lays eggs. Abn [[assumption and assignment]] is just a [[novation]] by another name.
Perhaps the “duck rabbit” is the better philosophical metaphor. You call it a “rabbit”, but it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, and lays eggs. An [[assignment and assumption]] is just a [[novation]] by another name.


A bilateral contract is not a “material thing”, in the [[Cartesian]] sense: it is not ''[[res extensa]]''. It has no life independent of [[Consensus ad idem|the minds of the people]] who entered it. A contract is A’s ''personal'' obligation to B, and B’s ''personal'' obligation to A. Those obligations are defined by reference to their obligor: they do not — ''cannot'' float free of the person must see to it that they are carried out. Obligations have no separate legal personality and no independent existence.  
A bilateral contract is not a “material thing”, in the [[Cartesian]] sense: it is not ''[[res extensa]]''. It has no life independent of [[Consensus ad idem|the minds of the people]] who entered it. A contract is A’s ''personal'' obligation to B, and B’s ''personal'' obligation to A. Those obligations are defined by reference to their obligor: they do not — ''cannot'' float free of the person must see to it that they are carried out. Obligations have no separate legal personality and no independent existence.  

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