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 Hmm. So however long you run Conway’s life game, it does not seem to arrive at [[rice pudding and income tax]]. Reductionists say “Ah, but that is just because the rules aren’t quite right, or we haven’t quite got the right initial configuration”. But then, they would say that.
-The idea that complexity is merely an emergent probability of a simple [[algorithm]] is quite the piece of eliminative reductionism. It converts all complex systems to no more than an insufficiently understood simple systems. This undermines the powerful distinction between [[simple]], [[Complicated system|complicated]] and [[Complex system|complex]] systems — they are now just points along a continuum, without hard boundaries between them — and undermines the explanatory power of complexity theory. It is really just saying, “well, in this complex system, ''something'' will happen; we don’t know what, but as and when it does we will be able to rationalise it as a function of our rules, by deducing what the missing data must have been.”
+The idea that [[complexity]] is merely an [[emergent]] probability of a simple [[algorithm]] is quite the piece of eliminative [[reductionism]]. Eliminative in that it eliminates complexity as discrete state. It converts all [[complex]] systems to no more than an insufficiently mapped understood simple systems.
+This is like saying — maybe it ''is'' saying —an [[analog]] signal is just an insufficiently granular [[digital]] signal. That the digital world isn't just a handy
+This undermines the powerful distinction between [[simple]], [[Complicated system|complicated]] and [[Complex system|complex]] systems — they are now just points along a continuum, without hard boundaries between them — and undermines the explanatory power of complexity theory. It is really just saying, “well, in this complex system, ''something'' will happen; we don’t know what, but as and when it does we will be able to rationalise it as a function of our rules, by deducing what the missing data must have been.”
 Ex-post facto rationalisation to comply with your rules is rather like the work normal scientists do in a research programme, of course. It is a form of narratisation.