Can’t we just ask the regulator?: Difference between revisions

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Anyone in the business will know this is the aspiration of an utter fantasist. Anglo Saxon regulators wouldn’t dream of giving guidance, perhaps fearing the [[precedent]] an erroneous ruling night create, perhaps acknowledging that their own staff have no better idea what the rules are meant to mean than anyone else: they are as prone to budget cuts, outsourcing, and the dogma of management by data as anyone else.
Anyone in the business will know this is the aspiration of an utter fantasist. Anglo Saxon regulators wouldn’t dream of giving guidance, perhaps fearing the [[precedent]] an erroneous ruling night create, perhaps acknowledging that their own staff have no better idea what the rules are meant to mean than anyone else: they are as prone to budget cuts, outsourcing, and the dogma of management by data as anyone else.


==== Cases in point ====
== JPMorgan, the NDA and the whistleblowers ==
So we hear that JPMorgan has been fined for signing [[confidentiality agreement]]<nowiki/>s that violated Rule 21F-17(a) of the [[Securities Exchange Act of 1934]]<nowiki/>prohibiting action that impedes communication with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission|SEC]] about possible securities law violation. We don’t know the specifics, but it doesn’t seem to be alleged that Morgan intended this, or that it took any positive steps to enforce its NDAs in this way, but rather that the confidentiality agreements ''might'' have had that effect, or been used this way.
So we hear that JPMorgan agreed to pay the [[SEC]] a US$18m fine for signing [[confidentiality agreement]]s that violated Rule 21F-17(a) of the [[Securities Exchange Act of 1934]] prohibiting action that impedes communication with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission|SEC]] about possible securities law violation. We don’t know the specifics, but it doesn’t seem to be alleged that Morgan intended this, or that it took any positive steps to enforce its NDAs in this way, but rather that the confidentiality agreements ''might'' have had that effect, or been used this way.


If that is right then we have a wholesale rewrite of confidentiality agreements about to descend on us. The NDA is a well understood beast: its principles are pretty standardised, even if their articulation is not. One principle is “you may disclose confidential information to a regulator if you are firmly asked for it, or compelled to do so”.
If that is right then we have a wholesale rewrite of confidentiality agreements about to descend on us. The NDA is a well-understood beast: its principles are pretty standardised, even if their articulation is not. One principle is “you may disclose confidential information to a regulator if you are firmly asked for it, or compelled to do so”.


The SEC’s whistleblowing rule requires something more than that: you must be free to disclose information that may indicate securities law violations ''if you wish to''. There is no ''obligation'' on anyone to disclose violations, however, so an [[Confidentiality agreement|NDA]] drafted along market standard terms would not explicitly permit whistleblowing. You might try to get home if you have a general “this agreement is to be read to be consistent with all laws as they apply to the parties” but you are reaching a bit here.
The [[SEC]]’s whistleblowing rule requires something more than that: you must be free to disclose information that may indicate securities law violations ''if you feel like it''. No-one is ''obliged'' to be a whistleblower, however, so an [[Confidentiality agreement|NDA]] drafted along market standard terms would not, explicitly, permit whistleblowing. You might try to get home if you have a general “this agreement is to be read to be consistent with all laws as they apply to the parties” but you are reaching a bit here.


JP Morgan’s release said:
The SEC release agreed with JPMorgan said:
{{Quote|“[JPMS client] and [JPMS client’s] attorneys are neither prohibited nor restricted from responding to any inquiry about this settlement or its underlying facts by FINRA, the SEC, or any other government entity or self-regulatory organization, or as required by law.”<ref>{{plainlink|https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99344.pdf|SEC settlement order}}</ref>}}
{{Quote|“[JPMS client] and [JPMS client’s] attorneys are neither prohibited nor restricted from responding to any inquiry about this settlement or its underlying facts by FINRA, the SEC, or any other government entity or self-regulatory organization or as required by law.”<ref>{{plainlink|https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99344.pdf|SEC settlement order}}</ref>}}
You can ''answer questions'' from regulators — without compulsion — but you can’t ''volunteer'' things they did not ask for.  
You can ''answer questions'' from regulators — without compulsion — but you can’t ''volunteer'' things they did not ask for.  


Editorialising for a bit — I know, right: who? me? — then unless JPMorgan wilfully meant to prevent whistleblowing, this seems like a ''bad'' precedent. Nothing in the {{Plainlink|https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2024-7|SEC’s press release}} about the fine indicates this is the case. So firstly, JPMorgan is being fined, basically, for agreeing pretty standard NDAs.
Editorialising for a bit — I know, right: who? me? — then unless JPMorgan wilfully meant to prevent whistleblowing, this seems like a ''bad'' precedent. Nothing in the {{Plainlink|https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2024-7|SEC’s press release}} about the fine indicates this is the case. So firstly, JPMorgan is being fined, basically, for agreeing to pretty standard NDAs.


Secondly, and it is a point Matt Levine makes with typical brio, this means that the securities law violation you can blow the whistle on — and be rewarded under the whistleblowing programme for — is ''the existence of the NDA itself''. The NDA contravenes Rule 21F-17(a), after all.
Secondly, and it is a point Matt Levine makes with typical brio, this means that the securities law violation you can blow the whistle on — and be rewarded under the whistleblowing programme for — is ''the existence of the NDA itself''. The NDA contravenes Rule 21F-17(a), after all.
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But as above, in as much as they cleave to the market standard of permitting disclosure to regulators when asked, ''all'' standard NDAs breach Rule 21F-17(a). Not because anyone meant to, but because this is a unique exception that has never occurred to anyone before. It would be interesting to know who planted the idea of this enforcement in the SEC’s head. We have all heard of lawyers chasing ambulances: here is an ambulance chasing the lawyers.  
But as above, in as much as they cleave to the market standard of permitting disclosure to regulators when asked, ''all'' standard NDAs breach Rule 21F-17(a). Not because anyone meant to, but because this is a unique exception that has never occurred to anyone before. It would be interesting to know who planted the idea of this enforcement in the SEC’s head. We have all heard of lawyers chasing ambulances: here is an ambulance chasing the lawyers.  


In another facet of US justice administration, JPMorgan has agreed to the settlement without admission or denial of liability — perhaps taking the pragmatic view than an eighteen million dollar fine is a drop in the ocean compared to the administrative time and burnt marital capital that it would take to contest such a charge. But in doing so Morgan has acquiesced to a bad principle, thereby enacting it on everyone else.
In another facet of US justice administration, JPMorgan has agreed to the settlement without admission or denial of liability — perhaps taking the pragmatic view that a USD$18m fine is a drop in the ocean compared to the administrative time and burnt marital capital that it would take to contest such a charge. But in doing so, Morgan has acquiesced to a bad principle, thereby enacting it on everyone else.


Expect a flurry of activity in the NDA space and — inevitably — the lengthening of an already tedious symbolic ritual.   
Expect a flurry of activity in the NDA space and — inevitably — the lengthening of an already tedious symbolic ritual.