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There are not just these “cry fire in a crowded theatre” effects whereupon everyone stampedes for the exits at once, but second-order effects. You might not wish to head for the exit: you might be strong-willed enough to rise above the madding crowd — but you might still have no choice. You are not independent when your asthma inhaler is in your spouse’s rucksack.  
There are not just these “cry fire in a crowded theatre” effects whereupon everyone stampedes for the exits at once, but second-order effects. You might not wish to head for the exit: you might be strong-willed enough to rise above the madding crowd — but you might still have no choice. You are not independent when your asthma inhaler is in your spouse’s rucksack.  


An investor long “on margin” might wish to ride out a sudden correction by meeting margin calls. In most dislocations this is the obvious and — if you can manage it, correct — thing to do. Such an investor might, per its own books and records, be solvent, well-capitalised and In good standing with its banks. But meeting the margin call means drawing on a stand by [[revolving credit facility]] — who keeps a yard of cash off the table for emergencies? — and it turns out your bank is experiencing a liquidity squeeze. They evoke some buried condition precedent they say is buried in the docs and unexpectedly pulls your lines, or suspends withdrawals, as a result. This is nothing to do with you: this is caused by it's ''own'' market exposure. At the same time your margin lenders — usually so patient with you, generally genial, good for a knees-up at Ascot and tolerant of peripheral looseness in your margin operations — have had a sense of humour failure. They are apologetic, but they are shipping a shower of grief from risk management and have been told to tell you that you today there is no flex, today the money must be there without fail —and for good measure they are jacking up your IM. You tell them this is absurd, that everything is fine, ''but today they don’t know what to believe''. Normal conditions of trust are suspended. This could be the final round. Anything they can’t see unaided with their own naked eyes could be fake news. The one thing they can see is that ''everyone else is running for the door''.
If you are long “on margin” you might wish to ride out a sudden correction by meeting your margin calls. In most dislocations this is the obvious and — if you can manage it, correct — thing to do. You might, per your own books and records, be solvent, well-capitalised and in good standing with your banks, so why not?
 
But meeting the margin call means drawing on your standby [[revolving credit facility]] — you don’t keeps a yard of spare cash off the table for emergencies, right? — but it turns out your bank is, like everyone else, suffering a liquidity squeeze. It evokes some obscure market conditions [[CP]] buried in the docs and suspends drawdowns on the RCF as a result. This is nothing to do with you: the bank is managing its ''own'' cash position. It needs the money more than you.  
 
At the same time your margin lenders — usually so patient with you, generally genial, good for a knees-up at Ascot and tolerant of peripheral looseness in your margin operations — have had a sense of humour failure. They are apologetic, but they are shipping a shower of grief from risk management and have been told to tell you that you today there is no flex, today the money must be there without fail —and for good measure they are jacking up your IM. You tell them this is absurd, that everything is fine, ''but today they don’t know what to believe''. Normal conditions of trust are suspended. This could be the final round. Anything they can’t see unaided with their own naked eyes could be fake news. The one thing they can see is that ''everyone else is running for the door''.


The value of all that near-perfect market information evaporates and ''other'' information, which the market ''doesn’t'' have, but until now took for granted — such as the essential viability of systemically important financial institutions — is suddenly ''much'' more important. All at once, no-one fancies “taking a view” on ''anyone’s'' credit.
The value of all that near-perfect market information evaporates and ''other'' information, which the market ''doesn’t'' have, but until now took for granted — such as the essential viability of systemically important financial institutions — is suddenly ''much'' more important. All at once, no-one fancies “taking a view” on ''anyone’s'' credit.