Template:Isda 2(a)(iii) summ: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 1: Line 1:
====The problem with bilateral agreements====
As we have remarked before, most financing contracts are decidedly one-sided.  One party — the dealer, broker, bank: we lump these various financial service providers together as ''The Man'' — provides services, lends money, creates risk outcomes; the other — the customer — consumes them. Generally, the customer presents risks to The Man and not vice versa. All the weaponry is therefore pointed in one direction: the customer’s. It almost goes without saying that should the customer “run out of road”, the Man stands to ''lose'' something.
Even though the ISDA is also, in practice, a “risk creation contract” having these same characteristics, it is not, in theory, designed like one. Seeing the dealer and the customer for what they are involves seeing a rather bigger picture. In the small picture — the ISDA agreement proper — either party can be out of the money, and either party can blow up. The weaponry points both ways.
This presented the First Men with an unusual scenario when they were designing the {{isdama}}: what happens if ''you'' blow up when ''I'' owe money to you? Here I might not want to crystalise my contract: since it will involve me paying you a mark-to-market amount I hadn’t budgeted for I might not even be able to. (This is less of a concern in these days of mandatory bilateral variation margin, but the {{isdama}} was forged well before this modern era).
The answer the [[First Men]] came up with was the “flawed asset” provision of Section {{{{{1}}}|2(a)(iii)}}. There is an argument it wasn’t a good idea then; there is a better argument it isn’t a good idea now, but like so many parts of this sacred form it is there and, for hundreds and thousands of ISDA trading arrangements, we are stuck with it.
====Flawed assets generally====
====Flawed assets generally====
{{Flawed asset capsule|{{{1}}}}}
{{Flawed asset capsule|{{{1}}}}}