Template:Isda 3(d) summ: Difference between revisions

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We suppose this is excluded because the Party to the ISDA is not the author of the legal opinion, nor professionally competent to pass on its contents (hence the need for the legal opinion in the first place), so should hardly be expected to be held to account should it turn out to be wrong.
We suppose this is excluded because the Party to the ISDA is not the author of the legal opinion, nor professionally competent to pass on its contents (hence the need for the legal opinion in the first place), so should hardly be expected to be held to account should it turn out to be wrong.


But this, we submit, is to misunderstand in a profound way the point of a legal contract. Unlike criminal or even tort law, the law of contract is not an instrument of moral judgment. It cares only about economics: that one does, or does not, do what one has promised. It is incurious about ''why''. The object of a legal opinion is to be informed of a legal status. That legal status, being an abstract thing, can only be ''[[formal]]ly'' represented on the notepaper of a firm of solicitors. If what that notepaper says is not true, for whatever reason, then the legal status does not obtain, and the comfort your counterparty seeks from that legal opinion is misplaced.
But this, we submit, is to misunderstand in a profound way the point of a legal contract. Unlike criminal or even tort law, the law of contract is not an instrument of moral judgment. It cares only about economics: that one does, or does not, do what one has promised or — as in this case — that what one has represented to you is, or is not, true. The law of contract is broadly incurious about ''why''.  
 
The object of a legal opinion is to confirm the accuracy of a legal representation. Instead of simply representing that, for example, you have the regulatory permission to act as a swap dealer, you have a legal opinion to confirms that fact, from one who should know. If what that that legal opinion says is not true — if that one who ''should'' know in fact does not — then regardless of whose fault this is, or how egregious has been her negligence in being at fault, the regulatory permission required does not obtain, and the comfort your counterparty seeks from that legal opinion is misplaced. The representation is false, and the counterparty should be allowed out as a result.
====Credit Support documents====
====Credit Support documents====
====Annual reports====
====Annual reports====