Template:Isda Threshold Amount summ: Difference between revisions

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Because of the [[snowball effect]] that a {{tag|cross default}} clause can have on a party’s insolvency it should be big: like, [[bankruptcy|life-threateningly]] big — because the consequences of triggering a {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} are dire, and it may create its own chain reaction beyond the ISDA itself. So expect to see, against a [[swap dealer]], 2-3% of shareholder funds, or sums in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. For [[end users]] the number may well be a lot lower (especially for thinly capitalised investment vehicles like [[Hedge fund|fund]]s  — like, ten million dollars or so — and, of course, will key off [[NAV]], not shareholder funds.
Because of the [[snowball effect]] that a {{tag|cross default}} clause can have on a party’s insolvency it should be big: like, [[bankruptcy|life-threateningly]] big — because the consequences of triggering a {{isdaprov|Cross Default}} are dire, and it may create its own chain reaction beyond the ISDA itself. So expect to see, against a [[swap dealer]], 2-3% of shareholder funds, or sums in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars. For [[end users]] the number may well be a lot lower (especially for thinly capitalised investment vehicles like [[Hedge fund|fund]]s  — like, ten million dollars or so — and, of course, will key off [[NAV]], not shareholder funds.
, it needs to be high. for a bank, typically 2 or 3% of [[tier 1 capital|shareholder equity]] or USD100,000,000 — for a fund an equivalent portion of [[NAV]].