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{{2010 GMSLA Section 9 TOC}} | {{2010 GMSLA Section 9 TOC}} | ||
Paragraph {{gmslaprov|9}} of the {{gmsla}} is broadly the same in the {{pgmsla}}, only with no reference to failure by the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} to return {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Collateral}}, all for the sensible reason that, under the {{pgmsla}} construct, the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} never gets its mitts on the {{pgmslaprov|Collateral}} in the first place, so is hardly in a position to fail to return it. | |||
===Comparable master agreements=== | |||
We are given to understand that neither the {{gmra}}, its American cousin the {{mra}} nor the American stock lending agreement the {{msla}} have comparable mini-close-out provisions, though it is understood as a matter of good form that where there has been a simple innocent settlement failure and one can safely [[buy in]] — thereby helping oneself — one would never be so vulgar or unsportspersonlike as to actually call an [[Event of Default]]. And the market seems cool with that — [[cognitive dissonance]] to the power of one — until it comes to worrying whether that will impact a cross-default under a neighbouring {{isdama}}, at which point the buyside market flips out — [[cognitive dissonance]] to the power of a ''trillion''. |