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Here is where history — real history , not the synthetic history afforded by data modernism — makes a difference. | Here is where history — real history , not the synthetic history afforded by data modernism — makes a difference. | ||
When it is at rest, the realistic range in which a stock can move in a liquidity period — its “gap risk” — is relatively stable. Say, 30 percent of its [[market value]]. (This [[market value]] we derive from technical and fundamental readings: the business ’s book value, the presumption that there is a sensible [[bid]] and [[ask]], so that the stock will oscillate around its “true value” as bulls and bears cancel each other out. | |||
But, because it is assembled from static snapshots which don't move and therefore carry ''no'' intrinsic risk, [[data modernism]] is not good at estimating how long a risk period should be. Each snapshot is a still life in which a “[[glass half full]]” and a “[[glass half empty]]” look alike. | |||
We apply the our risk tools to them as if they were the same: ''assuming the market value is fair, how much could I lose in the time it would realistically take me to sell''? 30 percent, right? | |||
But they are ''not'' the same. | |||
If my stock trades at 200 today, it makes a difference that it traded at 100 yesterday, 50 the day before that, and over the last ten years it has traded in a range between 25 and 35. This history tells us this glass is massively, catastrophically over-full. With that history might think a drop of 30pc is our best case scenario | |||
====Liquidity period - how long is your risk period==== | ====Liquidity period - how long is your risk period==== | ||
====Snapshots of a glass half full are a bad proxy==== | ====Snapshots of a glass half full are a bad proxy==== |