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 :—[[Nancy Cartwright]], {{br|How the Laws of Physics Lie}} (1983)}}
-[[how the laws of data science lie|In]] 1983 philosopher [[Nancy Cartwright]] wrote the seemingly scurrilous {{Br|How the Laws of Physics Lie}} — not quite the post-modernist tripe it sounds, but rather a serious and literate work of analytical philosophy. Cartwright’s point was that scientific laws are formulated in conditions so rigid, isolated and controlled that, even though they might be perfectly valid within those conditions, they are practically useless “in the real world,” where those conditions have no hope of existing. So the principles of Newton’s mechanics, assuming as they do no inconveniently intervening forces like friction, gravity, inelasticity, might plat the trajectory of an object on a graph, but have no chance of plotting the trajectory of the proverbial [[Crisp-packet blowing across St Mark’s square|crisp packet blowing across St Mark’s Square]]. You will spend a lot of time with a slide rule and an anemometer; when you look up the packet will be gone.
+[[how the laws of data science lie|In]] 1983 philosopher [[Nancy Cartwright]] wrote the seemingly scandalous book {{Br|How the Laws of Physics Lie}}. It is not quite the [[post-modernist]] screed it sounds, but rather a serious and literate, but difficult, work of analytical philosophy. Cartwright’s argument is that scientific laws are formulated in conditions so rigid, isolated and controlled that, even though they might be perfectly valid within those conditions, they are practically useless “in the real world,” where those conditions have no hope of existing.
+{{quote|We explain by ''[[ceteris paribus]]'' laws, by composition of causes, and by approximations that improve on what the fundamental laws dictate. In all of these cases the fundamental laws ''patently do not get the facts right''.}}
+So Newton’s mechanics assuming, as they do, no inconveniently intervening forces like friction, gravity, inelasticity, might plot the trajectory of an object on a graph, but have no chance with the proverbial [[Crisp-packet blowing across St Mark’s square|crisp packet blowing across St Mark’s Square]]. You could spend a lot of time with a slide rule and an anemometer; when you look up the packet will be gone.
 The same observation animates [[Gerd Gigerenzer]]’s faith in [[Heuristic|heuristics]] over science: despite [[Richard Dawkins]]’ trite conviction to the contrary, a fielder performs no differential equations on the way to catching a flying cricket ball.
-We trick ourselves into believing the power of our scientific laws, wilfully blind to the ad hoc variations, adjustments and glosses that our messy world inposes upon them; we put down any apparent disparity to this ineffable collection of intervening forces: we tell ourselves the laws of physics describe an idealised, Platonic model; our messy world is anything but, so we should ''expect'' variances from those pure predictions.
+We trick ourselves into believing the power of our scientific laws, wilfully blind to the ad hoc variations, adjustments and glosses that our messy world imposes upon them; we put down any apparent disparity to this ineffable collection of intervening forces: we tell ourselves the laws of physics describe an idealised, Platonic model; our messy world is anything but, so we should ''expect'' variances from those pure predictions.
+Now this is all well and good: we are simply “pragmatising” scientific laws: recasting them as rules of thumb and generalised guides to how the physical world will behave — they set outer bounds to our expectations but will not give us a fine-grained real-time means of navigating the world. For example: the laws of physics tell us no cricket ball will attain escape velocity from a human bat-swing, however well struck; nor will it morph into a bowl of petunias as we try to catch it. But as for the ''precise'' trajectory of spacetime it will pass through as I try to catch it — if science could ever yield an approximation of that, it would be far too late to be useful, and really we don’t have anything like enough data to run the calculations in any case.
+So we need to rely on judgment, the facility for catching we have acquired through a lifetime of experience and practice, none of which involved solving a single differential equation: you cannot, as [[Nassim Taleb]] says, lecture birds on how to fly. Science is a convenient post-hoc explanation of what we did, not a guide to what we must do.
+But the physical world is a [[complicated system]]: generally, a very, ''very'' [[complicated system]], but insofar as the law of physics are concerned, not a [[Complexity|complex]] one: we do not, by applying our models of physics to to the world, change how the world behaves. It is still in a sense linear: it is just our rules are approximations, not specific predictions. So the “lie” perpetrated by the laws of physics is broadly benign.
-Now this is all well and good: we are simply pragmatising scientific laws: recasting them as rules of thumb and generalistic guides to what should happen — they can set outer bounds to our expectations — but will not give us a fine-grained real-time means of navigating the world. We need to rely on our judgment and acquired experience for that: you cannot, as Nassim Taleb says, lecture birds on how to fly.
+The [[JC]]’s sense is a similar thing may be true of data science, only it is less benign.
-But the physical world is a complicated system: generally, a very, very complicated system, but insofar as the law of physics are concerned, not complex: we do not, by applying our laws of physics to it, change how it behaves. It is still in a sense linear: it is just our rules are approximations, not specific predictions. So the lie perpetrated by the laws of physics is broadly benign.
+We tell ourselves that data models can predict our behaviour, are unfailingly accurate, that we should yield to their greater power. We no longer need “thick” human rules of moral principle to moderate our behaviour, because machines can systematically apply infinitesimally [[thin rules]] that equably adjudicate on any given particular. This is all the more concerning with the advent of [[neural network]]s and [[large language model]]s that we readily confess we do not understand at all, but we were already there, in our collective obeisance to, for example, the truth of DNA testing, or GPS navigation, or automated self-triage. It ''seems'' plausible; we don’t feel like we have good grounds to challenge it, so we defer to it. We suppose spitting in a tube can tell us with certainty that we are 99.4% Scottish, 0.2% North African with a smudge around Scandinavia, less than 4% Neanderthal, but don’t pick up any African heritage at all — despite the fact that every human on the planet is, ultimately, 100% African by origin (''homo sapiens'' diverged from ''homo neanderthalensis'' hundreds of thousands of years before any human departed Africa).
-We have a sense a similar thing may be true of data science.
+These [[thin rules]] ''lie'': they give us a false comfort in the truth of the things they opine about, the same way science does.<ref>{{author|Nancy Cartwright}}, {{br|The Laws of Physics Lie}}.</ref> So there aren’t ''really'' 590 calories in that burger — it seems plausible if it is printed on the menu card, but the more permanently it is printed the less likely it is to be true. There are not really 49.57km in those directions to the airport, the DNA tests really don’t know whether you are partly Bulgarian, ten thousand steps won’t transport you to health, ten thousand hours won’t make you into a concert violinist, two litres of water won’t ward off dehydration — but you as a layperson and none the wiser, so the claim can be made and got away with. It's not independently testable.  How would you know?  Your implicit trust in untestable propositions but gets trust, and from nowhere the [[Data modernism|data modernist]]s have bootstrapped themselves into a kind of credibility.