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Hence, having collateral from each customer is important for the dealer. As long as each of the dealer’s other customers it providing it collateral, and the dealer is competently delta-hedging, being paid cash collateral by the dealer is far less important for the customer.   
Hence, having collateral from each customer is important for the dealer. As long as each of the dealer’s other customers it providing it collateral, and the dealer is competently delta-hedging, being paid cash collateral by the dealer is far less important for the customer.   


Is that the sound of [[Lehman]] [[horcrux]]<nowiki/>es sparking up I hear?  
Is that the sound of [[Lehman]] [[horcrux]]<nowiki/>es sparking up I hear?


==== On the case for one-way margin ====  
==== On the case for one-way margin ====  
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===Voluntary margin===
===Voluntary margin===
No-one of this stops the dealer recognising the “equity” in a customer’s unrealised [[mark-to-market]] gains and extending credit — increasing lines — against it. This is what margin lenders and cash prime brokers do every day of the week.  
No-one of this stops the dealer recognising the “equity” in a customer’s unrealised [[mark-to-market]] gains and extending credit — increasing lines — against it. This is what [[Margin lending|margin lenders]] and physical prime brokers do every day of the week.  


But this lending is discretionary, and dealers can apply the haircuts, credit terms and diversification criteria as they see fit. The dealer can decide where and when to draw its lines.
But this lending is discretionary, and dealers can apply whatever [[haircut]]<nowiki/>s, credit terms and diversification criteria they choose. Regulatory VM must be paid in full and in cash. Imagine if retail banks were ''forced'' to pay out to mortgage customers the value of unrealised gains on their properties! 


Imagine if lending banks were ''forced'' to pay mortgage customers the value of unrealised gains on their house prices. Imagine how much worse the global financial crisis would have been then.  
“But, but, but, JC: there is a difference. Where a house is concerned, the customer ''owns'' the house.  It has no credit exposure to the bank for the house. If the bank fails, the customer keeps its house. With a swap, the customer would lose everything.” 


“But, but, but, JC: there is a difference. Where a house is concerned, the customer owns the house.  It has no credit exposure to the bank for the house. If the bank fails, the customer keeps its house. With a swap, the customer would lose everything. All this is true. But, equally the customer’s personal capital outlays for that house — its real investment — is 20% (at the time of the GFC it might have been closer to 0%). This is a levered play.  
All this is true. But, equally the customer’s personal capital outlays for that house — its real investment — is 20% (at the time of the GFC it might have been closer to 0%). A house is a levered play. A customer might technically “own” the house, but only in a very contingent sense: if it cannot keep up its mortgage payments, it will not own the house much longer.  


The same is true of a derivative exposure. It is an implied loan. The customer puts down its initial margin — economically equivalent to a deposit — and gets the return of the whole asset. The bank’s interest is to optimise its funding and to earn a commission on the opening and closing of the trade. It agrees to lend 70 percent of the starting value of the asset. If the customer wants to isolate its credit exposure from the dealer, it can take out a margin loan against a physical asset, just like a mortgage. Or it can take its profit, close out its trade and find out the terms on which the dealer will reset.
The same is true of a derivative exposure. It is, as above, an implied loan. The customer puts down its initial margin — economically equivalent to a deposit — and gets the return of the whole asset. The bank optimises its funding and to earns a commission on the opening and closing of the trade. It lends 70% of the initial value of the asset. If the customer wants to isolate its dealer credit exposure, it can take out a margin loan against a physical asset, just like a mortgage. Or it can take its profit, close out its trade and find out the terms on which the dealer will reset.
 
For several reasons:
 
Banks are Banks are not losing value on the customer positions: as per the above, they are delta-hedged. Banks have no market exposure unless their clients go bust.
 
Banks generally go bust because their clients go bust. They don’t go bust by themselves—I know, I know, Silicon Valley Bank did, but it is an honourable exception that proves the rule.
 
If we are worried about bank solvency, then forcing the bank to cash settle unrealised gains on derivatives portfolios is a bad idea.
 
“settling to market” every day with an important distinction: you don
 
Banks are independently capital regulated for solvency.


Swap counterparties are sophisticated professionals with the tools and resources to monitor credit exposure to their dealers and brokers. (We take it that understanding the [[financial weapons of mass destruction]] that these sophisticates truck in require more ninja wizardry than does weighing up the creditworthiness of a regulated financial institution).
Swap counterparties are sophisticated professionals with the tools and resources to monitor credit exposure to their dealers and brokers. (We take it that understanding the [[financial weapons of mass destruction]] that these sophisticates truck in require more ninja wizardry than does weighing up the creditworthiness of a regulated financial institution).


It is a much better discipline for sophisticated counterparts to manage their credit exposure — spread it around, so to speak, than to require their banks to send hard cash out the door as collateral to clients with outsized exposures.  
It is a ''much'' better discipline for financial sophisticates to manage their dealer credit exposure — spread it around, so to speak than to require their dealers to send them hard cash so they can double down with individual dealers.  


Every dollar these banks pay away reduces the capital buffer the bank has available for everyone else.  It also provides the customer with free money on an unrealised [[mark-to-market]] position. This is like paying out while the roulette wheel is still spinning, in the expectation of where the ball might land. That is a loan: if the customer doubles down and loses, you don’t get your money back.  
Every dollar these banks pay away reduces the capital buffer the bank has available for everyone else.  It also provides the customer with free money on an unrealised [[mark-to-market]] position. This is like paying out while the roulette wheel is still spinning, in the expectation of where the ball might land. That is a loan: if the customer doubles down and loses, you don’t get your money back.  


Daily mark to market moves are mainly ''noise''. Yet this is what parties must collateralise against. A great deal of the back-and-forth of variation margin is accomodating noise
Daily [[mark-to-market]] moves are mainly ''noise''. Yet this is what parties must collateralise against. A great deal of the back-and-forth of variation margin is ''accommodating noise''. The signal emerges over a prolonged duration. Over the short run posted collateral can, as we know a system effect: if I double down on an illiquid position, it will tend to rise, and I will get more margin, and — this is the story of [[Archegos]].
. The signal emerges over a prolonged duration. Over the short run posted collateral can, as we know a system effect: if I double down on an illiquid position, it will tend to rise, and I will get more margin, and — this is the story of [[Archegos]].


The increased systemic exposure of banks failing — which is what the margin regs were designed to address — is not caused by the banks themselves, but by their client exposures. Client exposures in turn are a function of client failures, which are in turn a function of leverage  
The increased systemic exposure of banks failing — which is what the margin regs were designed to address — is not caused by the banks themselves, but by their client exposures. Client exposures in turn are a function of client failures, which are in turn a function of leverage  


Their failure shouldn't, typically, be a systemic risk unless their unusually size, interconnectedness or unintended system effects ''make'' them systematically important, in which case they should be regulated if they are systemically important, and made to hold capital, and (b) they have the market position and bargaining power to negotiate margin terms.
Their failure shouldn’t, typically, be a systemic risk unless their unusually size, interconnectedness or unintended system effects ''make'' them systematically important, in which case they should be regulated if they are systemically important, and made to hold capital, and (b) they have the market position and bargaining power to negotiate margin terms.