Template:M intro isda qualities of a good ISDA: Difference between revisions

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The instinct to “let it go” is so pronounced that compliance teams have contrived means to prevent the business granting these concessions for fear they are seen as impermissible “inducements”.<ref>Were it not for the deeply embedded [[agency problem]] inside most organisations, by dint of which these  arrangements could well be, this would be a bit silly. As It is, it probably isn’t.</ref>
The instinct to “let it go” is so pronounced that compliance teams have contrived means to prevent the business granting these concessions for fear they are seen as impermissible “inducements”.<ref>Were it not for the deeply embedded [[agency problem]] inside most organisations, by dint of which these  arrangements could well be, this would be a bit silly. As It is, it probably isn’t.</ref>


In any case, the [[commercial imperative]] is so overwhelming a factor in ongoing business relationship that there is little point in asking for, let alone achieving, terms that go beyond fair. ''No-one will ever use them''. Seeing as, all other things being equal, you will conclude a fair contract faster than an unfair one — [[the ideal negotiation is no negotiation|the ideal negotiation is ''no'' negotiation]] — you should start with a fair template.
In any case, the [[commercial imperative]] is so overwhelming a factor in ongoing business relationship that there is little point in asking for, let alone achieving, terms that go beyond “fair”. ''No-one will ever use them''. Seeing as, all other things being equal, you will conclude a fair contract faster than an unfair one — [[the ideal negotiation is no negotiation|the ideal negotiation is ''no'' negotiation]] — you should start with a fair template.


===Confident===
===Confident===
{{Drop|Y|our form should}} also inspire confidence, and not fear, in your own negotiating team. It is a fact of life that negotiators these days have less combat experience and expertise than they once had. If they are to do a good job they need to feel comfortable with their tools. They should ''understand'' your templates and the product it governs. You should encourage them to go beyond the contract’s formal articulation to grasp the underlying commercial drivers of the relationship. <ref>JC is well aware that, among [[management consultant]]s, this view borders on the heretical.</ref> If they do this, they will help you identify the parts of the contract that aren’t achieving what they seem to be.
{{Drop|Y|our form should}} also inspire confidence, and not fear, in your own negotiating team. It is a fact of life that negotiators these days have less combat experience and expertise than they once had. To do a good job they must be comfortable with their tools. They should ''understand'' the templates and the products they govern. They should go beyond the contract’s formal articulation to grasp the underlying commercial drivers of the relationship. <ref>JC is well aware that, among [[management consultant]]s, this view borders on the heretical.</ref> If they do, they can help you identify the parts of the contract that aren’t achieving what they seem to be.


A negotiator who fears her material will hide behind the formal rules you give her to manage it. She won’t be drawn to discuss it live — if she doesn’t comfortably understand the form and what it is trying to achieve, why would she put that vulnerability on show? — so will hide behind her keyboard, thereby contributing to the familiar experience of electronic trench warfare. She will lob long, bulleted issues lists over no-man’s-lsnd and into the enemy’s advanced positions, or even internally to internal risk departments, where they will hidden and sputter, being passed about for days, before eventually being lobbed back, annotated in [[BLOCK CAPITALS]] and with appended with yet more more bullets. This state of impasse can go on, as it did in Ypres, for years. You could write [[strange negotiation|war poetry]] about it.  
By contrast, a negotiator who [[fear]]<nowiki/>s her material will hide behind the formal rules you give her to manage it. She won’t be drawn to discuss anything live — if she doesn’t understand the form and what it is trying to achieve, why would she put that vulnerability on show? — so will hide behind her keyboard, thereby contributing to the familiar experience of electronic trench warfare: she will lob long, bulleted issues lists over no-man’s-land and into the enemy’s advanced positions, or escalate that way internally to risk departments, where the missives will hiss and sputter, being passed about for days, before eventually being lobbed back, annotated in [[BLOCK CAPITALS]], appended with yet more more bullets points. This impasse can go last, as it did in Ypres, for years. You could write [[strange negotiation|war poetry]] about it.  


Reverence to and intimidation by your own contractual form is madness, of course. While we should not be surprised, in our [[High modernism|high modernist]] times, that we fetishise the [[Substance and form|form over the substance]], ''deference'' to a contractual form that is plainly suboptimal is no cause for celebration. A confident negotiating team ''engages'' with the form rather than deferring to it. This is the negotiator’s version of “[[jidoka]]”: the human touch that makes the machine sing.
Reverence to and intimidation by your own contractual form is madness, of course. While we should not be surprised, in our [[High modernism|high modernist]] times, that we fetishise the [[Substance and form|form over the substance]], ''deference'' to a contractual form that is plainly suboptimal is no cause for celebration. A confident negotiating team ''engages'' with the form rather than deferring to it. This is the negotiator’s version of “[[jidoka]]”: the human touch that makes the machine sing.