Template:M intro isda qualities of a good ISDA: Difference between revisions

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In which JC ventures forth, unbidden, onto the topic of ''what makes a good ISDA''. Mainly the same things that make ''any'' commercial contract good, but let’s not spoil a good story.
So, what makes for a good ISDA? What makes ''any'' commercial contract good?


The ISDA Master Agreement being what it is a stone tablet hewn, by conventional wisdom, from holy granite so as to ''avoid'' controversy — it goes without saying “the sacred fourteen” are already immaculate: we mean, of course, what makes a good ISDA ''{{isdaprov|Schedule}}''. For it will be toiling over that grubby mortal [[appendix]] — a crazed shadow thrown by guttering light across Plato’s craggy cave —that a [[negotiator]] will live out her days.<Ref>What is the difference between a schedule, an appendix and an annex?</ref>
Bear in mind that a contract fulfils different purposes for different constituents during its life. For [[Sales]], it is a tool of [[persuasion]]. For [[Credit]], a long-range defensive strategy. For [[Operations]], a manual. For the [[Legal Eagles]], a ''crust''.<ref>There is an expanded riff on this for, premium subscribers, [https://jollycontrarian.com/secure/index.php?title=Purpose '''here'''].</ref>


A scan of the sub-headings below will betray JC’s view: it should have five basic qualities:  ''fairness'', ''clarity'', ''consistency'', ''simplicity'' and aptness to instil ''confidence''. These qualities interact with and, in large part, depend on each other.   
Crystalline legal exactitude is but one quality and, in most cases an oddly insignificant one in that, once a contract is signed, the overwhelming likelihood is that ''no-one will ever look at it again''. Not even Ops, once they have punched the collateral eligibility criteria into their systems.
 
The ISDA Master Agreement being what it is — a stone tablet hewn, by conventional wisdom, from holy granite so as to ''avoid'' controversy — it goes without saying “[[the sacred fourteen]]” are already immaculate: we mean, of course, “what makes a good ISDA ''{{isdaprov|Schedule}}''”. For it will be toiling over that grubby mortal [[appendix]] — a crazed shadow thrown by guttering light across Plato’s craggy cave —that a [[negotiator]] will live out her days.<Ref>What is the difference between [[appendix|a schedule, an appendix and an annex]]?</ref>
 
It should have five basic qualities:  ''fairness'', ''confidence'', ''clarity'', ''consistency'' and ''simplicity''. These qualities interact with and, in large part, depend on each other.   


''Fair'' agreements must be ''clear'' for customers to realise they are fair.  
''Fair'' agreements must be ''clear'' for customers to realise they are fair.  
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''Clarity'' and ''fairness'' lend themselves also to ''consistency'' since, armed with it, you will be able to treat your customers the same way — with equanimity — and they will find less cause to object.  
''Clarity'' and ''fairness'' lend themselves also to ''consistency'' since, armed with it, you will be able to treat your customers the same way — with equanimity — and they will find less cause to object.  


''Clarity'', ''fairness'', ''confidence'' and ''consistency'' make for ''simplicity'': a simple record that is easy to create, maintain, roll out and, heaven forfend, enforce.
''Clarity'', ''fairness'', ''confidence'' and ''consistency'' make for ''simplicity'': a simple record that is easy to create, maintain, roll out and, heaven forfend, enforce.


===Fairness===
===Fairness===
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{{Drop|[[Qualities of a good ISDA|F]]|airness as an}} abstract quality seems like one of those lip-servicey, all-very-well-in-theory ideas that got you good grades in [[alternative dispute resolution]] class but will ship a haymaker to the jaw on first contact with reality. We are taught to treat legal [[negotiation]] as a kind of trench warfare: as if we are facing a mortal foe and not a valued customer. It is true that customers tend to be similarly disposed, so ''fairness'' never gets a chance to break out.
{{Drop|[[Qualities of a good ISDA|F]]|airness as an}} abstract quality seems like one of those lip-servicey, all-very-well-in-theory ideas that got you good grades in [[alternative dispute resolution]] class but will ship a haymaker to the jaw on first contact with reality. We are taught to treat legal [[negotiation]] as a kind of trench warfare: as if we are facing a mortal foe and not a valued customer. It is true that customers tend to be similarly disposed, so ''fairness'' never gets a chance to break out.


This is, in theory, odd. Why the hostility? After all, between good-faith traders in the marketplace, commercial negotiation is no [[single round prisoner’s dilemma]]. To show fairness is not to show weakness, but ''strength''.  
This is, in theory, odd. After all, between good-faith traders in the marketplace, commercial negotiation is no [[single round prisoner’s dilemma]]. To show fairness is not to show weakness, but ''strength''.  


Conundrums like this usually boil down to variations of the [[agency problem]] and can be untangled by asking, [[cui bono]]? Usually, it will be an [[agent]] such as like a professional adviser who is “making herself useful” by “[[for the avoidance of doubt|avoiding doubt]]”. This is no exception.  
So why the hostility? Puzzles like this often boil down to variations of the [[agency problem]]. They can usually be untangled by asking, ''[[cui bono]]''? Usually, we will find a well-meaning professional adviser “making herself useful” by “[[for the avoidance of doubt|avoiding doubt]]”. This is no exception.  


JC is, by lifelong experience, a [[sell-side]] guy: he comes at this from the perspective of a provider of financial services contracting with people who want them. Merchant and customer are, her as in any marketplace, generally on the same side: at the limit, their interests conflict, but gently: the merchant wants a [[commission]] or a mark-up, the customer wants a good price, but beyond that each wishes earnestly for the other’s continued prosperity.  
JC is, by lifelong experience, a [[sell-side]] guy: his clients are ''providers'' of financial services who contract with people who ''want'' them. Merchant and customer are, here as in any marketplace, generally aligned: at the limit, their interests conflict, but gently: the merchant wants a big [[commission]], the customer wants to pay a little one, but beyond that, each wishes earnestly for the other’s continued prosperity.  


Things ''can'' get chewy at the extremes when large sums of money are involved — but most dealers and most customers never get near a [[tail event|chewy extreme]].
Things ''can'' get chewy at the extremes when large sums of money are involved — but most dealers and most customers never get near a [[tail event|chewy extreme]].


Sell-siders occasionally engage with ostensible ''hostiles'' — competitors, for example — but when we do, there is an unspoken pact of [[good faith]] for the limited ends which brought the warring factions together. We must, at some level, trust one those with whom we contract. Me must have some common interest. If we did not, we would not contract at all. No-one enters a contract she expects her counterparty to break.
We occasionally engage directly with ostensible ''hostiles'' — competitors, for example — but even then, when we do so under an unspoken pact of [[good faith]] for the limited ends which have brought us together. We must, at some level, trust those with whom we contract, even if they are rivals. We must have some common interest. If we did not, we would not contract at all. {{maxim|No-one enters a contract she expects her counterparty to break}}.
 
Sidenote: the late [[David Graeber]] made a fascinating point when discussing the ''non''-origin of money from [[barter]]: [[barter]] is an arm’s length trade of equivalent goods between parties who are dispositionally ''rivals'' and not partners.
Once the exchange happens, nothing is left on the table; there is no presumption of goodwill, no expectation of further business, no obligations are undischarged. This is a [[delivery-versus-payment]] exchange between untrusting aliens. This is not needed within a community of trust. Where there is trust we need not extract a pound of flesh: there is a give and take; we let obligations lie undischarged on faith they will be performed later. Our gestures acquire a moral quality. These are the ties that bind — the imperative becomes to ''avoid'' fully discharging our dues to each other and thereby undoing those ties.  


Sidenote: [[David Graeber]] makes a fascinating point when discussing the ''non''-origin of currency out from [[barter]]: [[barter]] is an arm’s length trade of equivalent goods conducted between parties who are dispositionally ''rivals'' and not partners. Once the exchange happens, nothing is left on the table; there is no presumption of enduring goodwill, no expectation of further business, or any kind of obligation undischarged. A [[barter]] is a delivery-versus-payment exchange conducted between untrusting aliens. The contract ends upon exchange: no trust is needed. Inside your community, where there ''is'' trust, we are less compelled to extract a pound of flesh: there is a give and take; we let obligations lie undischarged on trust they will be performed later. Our gestures acquire a moral quality. These are the ties that bind — the imperative becomes to ''avoid'' fully discharging our dues to each other. This is the relationship we should aspire to with our customers. We trust them to pay later — we extend ''credit''. We do them favours, they appreciate it, and reward us with social capital, not economic capital, in the shape of more business.<ref>Hence, money emerged not from fair value barter with strangers, but as a way of evidencing and keeping track of indebtedness among friends. You don't extend credit to aliens.</ref>
This is the relationship we should aspire to with our customers. We trust them to pay later — we extend ''credit''. We do them favours, they appreciate it, and reward us with social, not economic, capital in the shape of more business. Hence, says Graeber, money emerged not from barter with strangers, but to memorialise indebtedness among friends. You don’t extend credit to aliens.


So, we presume [[good faith]] in any negotiation: ''some'' level of trust. We don’t negotiate with terrorists. If you can’t trust your counterparts, you fall into the “{{plainlink|https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m001w2dd/the-traitors-australia-series-2-episode-9|traitor’s dilemma}}”. This makes for good TV, but bad business.
So, we presume [[good faith]] in any negotiation: ''some'' level of trust. We don’t negotiate with terrorists. If you can’t trust your counterparts, you fall into the “{{plainlink|https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m001w2dd/the-traitors-australia-series-2-episode-9|traitor’s dilemma}}”. This makes for good TV, but bad business.


In any case, the “merchant-to-customer” contract is, by a landslide, the most common kind. Once finalised, these are filed somewhere and never again reviewed — it is bad form to pay too much attention the letter of the deal, even should there later be an argument.<ref>{{maxim|if you have to go to the contract, you’vecalready lost}}.</ref> Those with any [[inhouse counsel]] experience of bona fide, non-existential, customer disputes know one thing: if there is any doubt — and frequently, when there isn’t — ''the business will roll over''. No-one takes a point with a [[Insolvency|solvent]] client.
The “merchant-to-customer” contract is, by a landslide, the most common kind. Once signed, these are filed somewhere and never again reviewed — it is bad form to pay too much attention to the letter of a deal, even should there later be an argument.<ref>{{maxim|if you have to go to the contract, you’ve already lost}}.</ref>  


This is nothing more than common sense: you stand to gain far more in future revenue by preserving your relationship even where that means excusing a customer the occasional gaffe than you do by taking a literal stance on technical errors.  
[[Inhouse counsel]] with experience of bona fide, non-existential, customer disputes know one thing: if there is any doubt — and frequently, even when there isn’t — ''the business will roll over''. No-one takes a point with a [[Insolvency|solvent]] client.


The instinct amongst business people to “just let it go” is so pronounced, indeed, that compliance teams have found ways to prevent this happening for fear it is seen as an impermissible “inducement”.<ref>Were it not for the deeply embedded [[agency problem]] inside most organisations, by dint of which these  arrangements could well be, this would be a bit silly. As It is, it probably isn’t.</ref>
This is commercial common sense: you stand to gain far more in future revenue by preserving your relationship even where that means excusing a customer the occasional gaffe — demonstrating trust in your customer —than you do by taking a literal stance on technical errors. That is ''[[barter]]'' behaviour.


In any case, the [[commercial imperative]] is so overwhelming a factor in ongoing business relationship that there is little point in asking for, let alone achieving, terms that go beyond “fair”. ''No-one will ever use them''. Seeing as, all other things being equal, you will conclude a fair contract faster than an unfair one — [[the ideal negotiation is no negotiation|the ideal negotiation is ''no'' negotiation]] — you should start with a fair template.
This instinct amongst business people to “just let it go” is so pronounced, indeed, as to unnerve regulators and [[compliance]] teams, who have contrived ways to stop it, for fear it “induces” — a fancy way of saying “bribes” — clients to continue giving business.<ref>Were it not for the deeply embedded [[agency problem]] inside most organisations, by dint of which these  arrangements could well be, this would be a bit silly. As it is, it probably isn’t. The good old [[agency problem]], again.</ref>
 
In any case, the [[commercial imperative]] is so overwhelming that there is little point in asking for, let alone achieving, terms in contracts that go beyond “fair”. ''No-one will ever use them''. Seeing as, all other things being equal, you will conclude a fair contract faster than an unfair one — {{maxim|the ideal negotiation is no negotiation}} it behoves you to have a fair template.


Make your templates ''fair''.
Make your templates ''fair''.


===Confidence===
===Confidence===
{{Drop|Y|our form should}} also inspire confidence, and not ''[[fear]]'', in your own negotiating team. It is a fact of life that negotiators these days have less combat experience and expertise than they once had. To do a good, job you must be comfortable with you tools, not scared of them. You should ''understand'' your templates and the products they govern. You should go beyond the contract’s formal articulation to grasp the underlying commercial drivers of the business relationship. If you glom this, you can resolve most contractual points from first principles,<ref>JC is well aware that, among [[management consultant]]s, this view borders on the heretical.</ref> and help improve the form, identifying and fixing the parts that cause the most friction.
{{Drop|Y|our form should}} also inspire confidence, and not ''[[fear]]'', in your own negotiating team. It is a fact of life that negotiators these days have less combat experience and expertise than they once had. To do a good, job a negotiator must be comfortable with her tools, not scared of them. She should ''understand'' her templates and the products they govern. She should go beyond the contract’s formal articulation to grasp the underlying commercial drivers of the business relationship.  


A negotiator who [[fear|''fears'']] her material will hide behind the formal rules she is given to manage it. She won’t be drawn to discuss anything ''[[call, don’t email|live]]'' — if she doesn’t understand the form, why would she put her vulnerability on show? — so will hide behind her keyboard, contributing to the familiar experience of electronic trench warfare: she will lob long, bulleted issues lists over no-man’s-land and into the enemy’s advanced positions, or escalate that way internally to risk departments. When they land, her missiles — missives? — will hiss and sputter, being passed about for days, before eventually being lobbed back, appended with yet more more bullets and annotated in [[BLOCK CAPITALS]] and fetching interjections in {{Fontcolour|#FF00D4|'''hot pink'''}}. This impasse can last, as it did in Ypres, for years. You could write [[strange negotiation|war poetry]] about it.
If she groks this, she can resolve most contractual points from first principles,<ref>Among [[management consultant]]s, this view borders on the heretical. Bite me.</ref> and help improve the form, identifying and fixing the parts that cause the most friction. To put this in [[Management consultant|management consulting]] terms, this is ''[[jidoka]]'' from the [[Toyota Production System]]: “automation with a human touch”.  


{{Quote|“. . . I am the [[NAV trigger]] you pulled, my friend. You [[Waive|waived]] it not. <br>
A negotiator who [[fear|''fears'']] her material will hide behind the formal rules she is given to manage it. She won’t be drawn to discuss anything ''[[call, don’t email|live]]'' — if she doesn’t understand the form, why would she put her vulnerability on show? — so will hide behind her keyboard, contributing to the familiar experience of electronic trench warfare: she will lob long, bulleted issues lists over no-man’s-land and into the enemy’s advanced positions, or escalate that way internally to risk departments. When they land, her missiles — missives? — will hiss and sputter, being passed about for days, before eventually being lobbed back, appended with yet more more bullets and annotated in [[BLOCK CAPITALS]], ''ITALICS'' and fetching interjections in {{Fontcolour|#FF00D4|'''fuchsia'''}} and  {{Fontcolour|#C8A2C8|'''lilac'''}}.
 
This impasse can last, as it did in Ypres, for years. You could write [[strange negotiation|war peotry]] about it.
 
{{Quote|
“. . . I am the [[NAV trigger]] you pulled, my friend. You [[Waive|waived]] it not. <br>
In fog of war your unbending risk approach you would not flout<br>
In fog of war your unbending risk approach you would not flout<br>
Look, I missed a little [[margin call]], by just a bit: you [[Close out|closed me out]]. <br>
Look, I missed a little [[margin call]], by just a bit: you [[Close out|closed me out]]. <br>
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''([[strange negotiation|carries on]] for 94 pages)''}}
''([[strange negotiation|carries on]] for 94 pages)''}}


Reverence to and intimidation by your own contractual form is madness, of course. While we should not be surprised, in our [[High modernism|high modernist]] times, that our overlords fetishise the [[Substance and form|form over substance]], ''deference'' to a contractual form that is plainly suboptimal is no cause for celebration. A confident negotiating team ''engages'' with the form rather than deferring to it. This is the negotiator’s version of “[[jidoka]]”: the “human touch” that makes the machine sing.
Reverence to and intimidation by your own contractual form is madness, of course. While we should not be surprised, in our [[High modernism|high modernist]] times, that our overlords fetishise the [[Substance and form|form over substance]], ''deference'' to a contractual form that is plainly difficult or confusing is no cause for celebration. A confident negotiating team ''engages'' with the form rather than deferring to it.  


Make sure your team have ''confidence'' in your forms.
Make sure your team has ''confidence'' in your forms.


=== Clarity ===
=== Clarity ===
{{Drop|[[Qualities of a good ISDA|O]]|f the many}} [[The purpose of an ISDA|purposes of the ISDA]], most deal with the ''present'' — desired capital treatment; the availability of close-out [[Close-out netting|netting]], margin obligations — and the ''past''  —representations and warranties, and [[Section 2(a)(iii) - ISDA Provision|conditions precedent to transacting and continuing to perform]] — but only one deals with the ''future''. The close-out terms: the circumstance in which one can break the glass, sound the alarm and head for the lifeboats.


{{Drop|[[Qualities of a good ISDA|O]]|f the many}} [[The purpose of an ISDA|purposes of the ISDA]], most deal with the ''present'' — desired capital treatment; the availability of close-out [[Close-out netting|netting]], margin  obligations — and the ''past''  —representations and warranties, and [[Section 2(a)(iii) - ISDA Provision|conditions precedent to transacting and continuing to perform]] — but only one deals with the ''future''. The close-out terms: the circumstance in which one can break the glass, sound the alarm and head for the lifeboats.
Close-out terms only come into serious contemplation at times of extreme stress: the market’s, your management’s and, therefore, ''yours''. The more the firm stands to lose, the more extreme those stressy circumstances are likely to be. Management will become hysterical and lose any sense of perspective, make no bones about that, but so will the rest of the market. All manner of carefully concealed character flaws will be suddenly laid bare. Pay attention to this: this is where you ''really'' get to what people are like.
 
Closeout terms will only come into serious contemplation at times of extreme stress: the market’s, your management’s and, therefore, ''yours''. The more the firm stands to lose, the more extreme those stressy circumstances are likely to be. Your management will be going mad — make no bones about that but so will the market and, quite possibly, the geopolitical situation too. All kinds of people will be doing inexplicable things.  


Defaulting customers will be absent without official leave, responding to no communication channels at all. Bank chief executives won’t take each other’s calls. Prime Ministers will be ordering overseas embassies to max out their credit cards just to have cash on hand to meet the government’s obligations.<ref>This happened in New Zealand in 1981. [[Wage and price freeze|True story]]. </ref> Central bankers will be ordering the banks they regulate to lowball [[London Inter Bank Offered Rate|LIBOR]].<ref>Controversial, I know, but this seems increasingly likely to have been the case.</ref>
Defaulting customers will be absent without official leave, responding to no communication channels at all. Bank chief executives won’t take each other’s calls. Prime Ministers will be ordering overseas embassies to max out their credit cards just to have cash on hand to meet the government’s obligations.<ref>This happened in New Zealand in 1981. [[Wage and price freeze|True story]]. </ref> Central bankers will be ordering the banks they regulate to lowball [[London Inter Bank Offered Rate|LIBOR]].<ref>Controversial, I know, but this seems increasingly likely to have been the case.</ref> It will be ''chaos''.


We do not imagine that, when they crafted its close-out mechanics, the ’squad had in mind the wider general ''ambiance'' in which the ISDA’s s last-resort rights would be exercised. They ''can’t'' have. We imagine they pictured the close-out urge coming upon the responsible credit officer, in isolation, at a time of beatific placidity: that there would be time and space to consider and quietly contemplate what must be done, perhaps with a frisson of regret for the poor customer whom one is letting down.
We do not imagine that, when they crafted its close-out mechanics, the ’squad had in mind the wider general ''ambiance'' in which the ISDA’s s last-resort rights would be exercised. They ''can’t'' have. We imagine they pictured the close-out urge coming upon the responsible credit officer, in isolation, at a time of beatific placidity: that there would be time and space to consider and quietly contemplate what must be done, perhaps with a frisson of regret for the poor customer whom one is letting down.