Template:M intro technology rumours of our demise: Difference between revisions

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So how about using this technology to better exploit our existing natural intelligence, rather than imitating it? Could we create [[system effect]]s to ''extend'' the long tail?  
So how about using this technology to better exploit our existing natural intelligence, rather than imitating it? Could we create [[system effect]]s to ''extend'' the long tail?  


It isn’t hard to imagine how this might work. A rudimentary version exists in {{Plainlink|https://www.librarything.com/|LibraryThing}}’s recommendation engine. It isn’t even wildly clever '''—''' {{Plainlink|https://www.librarything.com/|LibraryThing}} has been around for nearly twenty years and doesn’t even use AI: each user lists, by ASIN, the books in her personal library. She can rate them, review them, and the LibraryThing algorithm will compare each users’s virtual “library” with all the other user libraries on the site and returns to you the users with the most similar libraries to yours.  
It isn’t hard to imagine how this might work. A rudimentary version exists in {{Plainlink|https://www.librarything.com/|LibraryThing}}’s recommendation engine. It isn’t even wildly clever '''—''' {{Plainlink|https://www.librarything.com/|LibraryThing}} has been around for nearly twenty years and doesn’t even use AI: each user lists, by ISBN, the books in her personal library. She can rate them, review them, and the LibraryThing algorithm will compare each users’s virtual “library” with all the other user libraries on the site and return the most similar user libraries to yours. The attraction of this is not the books you have in common but the ones you ''don’t''.


The effect is really quite uncanny. The non-matched books from libraries of similar users are often a revelation. My closest match is a user called eggnog2085 I share 62 books in common with her, out of 4,000 of hers, and 843 of mine. I can browse her books by cover, as if I am in a library, and see I find pretty much every book is interesting. The ones we have in common are among my absolute favourites. Her interests extend in different directions '''—''' more political history, But this is scratching the surface.  
The effect can be uncanny. My closest match is a user called eggnog2085. We have 62 books in common out of the 4,843 books between us. I can browse eggnog2085’s books, in a virtual library. The ones we have in common are among my favourite books. Many of eggnog2085’s books are new to me, and pretty much every one appeals. It is like wandering around a library designed to appeal specifically to me. You can see a meta-algorithm, that takes the most simpatico libraries and cross-references them for the most common books between them that are not in my library.  


This role — seeking out delightful new human endeavours — would be a valuable role ''that is quite beyond the capability of any group of humans'' and which would not devalue, much less usurp the value of human intellectual capacity. Rather, it would ''empower'' it.
LibraryThing generates this kind of delight with a relatively crude traditional algorithm. Imagine how it might perform with AI, trawling all of human creation with more granular information about user habits.  


''This'' is a suitable application for artificial intelligence. This would respect the division of labour between human and machine.
Note how this role — seeking out delightful new human creativity — satisfies our criteria for the division of labour in that it is quite beyond the capability of any group of humans to do it, and it would not devalue, much less usurp, genuine human intellectual capacity. Rather, it would ''empower'' it.


Note also the [[system effect]] it would have: it would encourage people to create unique and idiosyncratic things. It would distribute wealth and information — that is, [[strength]], not [[Power structure|power]] — ''along'' the curve of human diversity, rather than concentrating it at the top.
Note also the [[system effect]] it would have: if humans held out hope that algorithms were committed to exploring the long tail of human creativity, and not shepherding people towards bits monetisable head, this would incentivise humans to create unique and idiosyncratic things.  
 
It would have the system effect of distributing wealth and information — that is, [[strength]], not [[Power structure|power]] — ''along'' the curve of human diversity, rather than concentrating it at the top.


We have lying all around us, unused, petabytes of human ingenuity, voluntarily donated into the indifferent maw of the internet. ''We are not lacking ingenuity''. This is one problem homo sapiens ''does not have''. Why would we spend our energy on creating artificial sources of new intelligence? Surely the best way of using this brilliant new generation of machine is to harness the ingenuity that is literally lying around.
We have lying all around us, unused, petabytes of human ingenuity, voluntarily donated into the indifferent maw of the internet. ''We are not lacking ingenuity''. This is one problem homo sapiens ''does not have''. Why would we spend our energy on creating artificial sources of new intelligence? Surely the best way of using this brilliant new generation of machine is to harness the ingenuity that is literally lying around.
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==== Division of labour, redux ====
==== Division of labour, redux ====
About that “[[division of labour]]”. When it comes to mechanical tasks, machines — especially [[Turing machine]]<nowiki/>s — scale very well, while humans scale very badly. “Scaling” when we are talking about computational tasks means doing them over and over again, in series or parallel, quickly and accurately. Each operation can be identical; their combined effect astronomical. Of course machines are good at this: this is why we build them. They are digital: they preserve information indefinitely, however many processors we use, with almost no loss of fidelity.
About that “[[division of labour]]”. When it comes to mechanical tasks, machines — especially [[Turing machine]]s — scale very well, while humans scale very badly. “Scaling” when we are talking about computational tasks means doing them over and over again, in series or parallel, quickly and accurately. Each operation can be identical; their combined effect astronomical. Of course machines are good at this: this is why we build them. They are digital: they preserve information indefinitely, however many processors we use, with almost no loss of fidelity.


You could try to use networked humans to replicate a Turing machine, but the results would be disappointing and the humans would not enjoy it. Humans are slow and analogue. With each touch they ''degrade'' information (or ''augment'' it, depending on how you feel about it).  The [[signal-to-noise ratio]] would quickly degrade. (This is the premise for the parlour game “Chinese Whispers” — each repetition changes the signal. A game of Chinese Whispers among a group of Turing machines would be no fun at all.)  
You could try to use networked humans to replicate a Turing machine, but the results would be disappointing and the humans would not enjoy it. Humans are slow and analogue. With each touch they ''degrade'' information (or ''augment'' it, depending on how you feel about it).  The [[signal-to-noise ratio]] would quickly degrade. (This is the premise for the parlour game “Chinese Whispers” — each repetition changes the signal. A game of Chinese Whispers among a group of Turing machines would be no fun at all.)  
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In any case, you could not assign a human, or any number of humans, the task of “catalogue the entire output of human creative output”. With a machine, at least in concept, you could.<ref>Though this is sometime misleading, as I discovered when trying to find the etymology of the word “[[satisfice]]”. Its modern usage was coined by Herbert Simon in a paper in 1956, but the ngram suggests its usage began to tick up in the late 1940s. On further examination the records transpire to be mistranslations caused by optical character recognition errors. So there is a large part of the human oeuvre —the pre-digital bit that has had be digitised—that does suffer from analogue copy errors.</ref>
In any case, you could not assign a human, or any number of humans, the task of “catalogue the entire output of human creative output”. With a machine, at least in concept, you could.<ref>Though this is sometime misleading, as I discovered when trying to find the etymology of the word “[[satisfice]]”. Its modern usage was coined by Herbert Simon in a paper in 1956, but the ngram suggests its usage began to tick up in the late 1940s. On further examination the records transpire to be mistranslations caused by optical character recognition errors. So there is a large part of the human oeuvre —the pre-digital bit that has had be digitised—that does suffer from analogue copy errors.</ref>


But when it comes to imaginative uses of information we associate with the mind, humans scale magnificently. Here what we look for in “scaling” is very different. We don’t want identical, digital, high-fidelity duplication. Ten thousand copies of ''Finnegans Wake'' contribute no more to the human canon than does one.<ref>Or possibly, even ''none'': wikipedia tells us that, “due to its linguistic experiments, stream of consciousness writing style, literary allusions, free dream associations, and abandonment of narrative conventions, ''Finnegans Wake'' has been agreed to be a work largely unread by the general public.”</ref> Multiple humans contribute precisely that difference in perspective: a complex community of readers can, independently parse, analyse, explain, narratise, extend, criticise, extrapolate, filter, amend, correct, and improvise the information and each others’ reactions to it. This community of expertise is what Sam Bankman-Fried overlooks in his dismissal of Shakespeare’s “[[Bayesian prior|Bayesian priors]]” creates its own intellectual energy and momentum. No matter how fast it pattern-matches in parallel processes, artificial intelligence can’t do this.
But when it comes to imaginative uses of information we associate with the mind, humans scale magnificently. Here what we look for in “scaling” is very different. We don’t want identical, digital, high-fidelity duplication. Ten thousand copies of ''Finnegans Wake'' contribute no more to the human canon than does one.<ref>Or possibly, even ''none'': wikipedia tells us that, “due to its linguistic experiments, stream of consciousness writing style, literary allusions, free dream associations, and abandonment of narrative conventions, ''Finnegans Wake'' has been agreed to be a work largely unread by the general public.”</ref> Multiple humans contribute precisely that difference in perspective: a complex community of readers can, independently parse, analyse, explain, narratise, extend, criticise, extrapolate, filter, amend, correct, and improvise the information and each others’ reactions to it. This community of expertise is what [[Sam Bankman-Fried]] overlooks in his dismissal of Shakespeare’s “[[Bayesian prior|Bayesian priors]]” creates its own intellectual energy and momentum. No matter how fast it pattern-matches in parallel processes, artificial intelligence can’t do this.


===A real challenger bank===
===A real challenger bank===