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| If you like a bit of [[agency]] chat, you might like our articles about [[principal]]s and [[agent|agents]], [[undisclosed agent]]s, [[undisclosed principal]]s and all that good stuff.
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| ===Investment managers as agents===
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| In practice, many {{isdama}}s ''are'' entered by [[agent]]s — [[investment manager]]s and [[asset manager]]s (so-called “[[real money]]” managers) — on behalf of underlying [[principal|principals]] — [[investment fund]]s, and institutional clients who have appointed them as discretionary [[investment adviser]]s.
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| These [[manager]]s often enter transactions in aggregate and only allocate them to their underlying [[principal]]s later in the day. This means that the [[broker]] will have a nervous few hours before it knows whom it is expected to sue if the principal doesn’t pony up on time. General principles of [[agency]] — in particular liability for an [[undisclosed principal]] —mean [[agent]]s are not quite so footloose and fancy-free as many of them seem to believe.
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| Look, it is not the end of the world if your counterpart refuses to renounce all agency, as long as you set up the accounts correctly with the underlying principals, and the firm has a robust approach to trade allocation. Ultimately — and notwithstanding the nervous few hours pending allocation — the person against whom you are, long term, booking the trade ''is'' the principal.
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