Template:M summ Equity Derivatives 12.8(a): Difference between revisions

← Older edit

Template:M summ Equity Derivatives 12.8(a) (view source)

Revision as of 12:47, 21 February 2022

1,163 bytes added , 21 February 2022

no edit summary

Amwelladmin

Bureaucrats, Interface administrators, Administrators

82,891

edits

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-{{eqderivprov|Cancellation Amount}} is a beast of a definition. But when you boil it down, it’s pretty straightforward. It applies when terminating a {{eqderivprov|Transaction}} following an {{eqderivprov|Extraordinary Event}} or an {{eqderivprov|Additional Disruption Event}}.
+{{eqderivprov|Cancellation Amount}} is a beast of a definition. But when you boil it down, it’s pretty straightforward. It applies when terminating a {{eqderivprov|Transaction}} following an {{eqderivprov|Extraordinary Event}} or an {{eqderivprov|Additional Disruption Event}}. Importantly, by dint of Section {{eqderivprov|12.8(e)}}, the {{eqderivprov|Determining Party}} may pass through hedge breakage costs and losses.
+====Geopolitical events====
+Now, what gains or losses might the {{eqderivprov|Determining Party}} incur in replacing the material terms of the {{eqderivprov|Transaction}} if, due to wars, sanctions and other miscellaneous geopolitical hanky-panky, a market gets totally shut down? If, for example, the outside world has imposed economic sanctions on the jurisdiction in which your {{eqderivprov|Share}}s trade (as, at the time of writing,<ref>Feburary 2022.</ref> seems far possible for Russia), of if the {{eqderivprov|Share}}s’ jurisdiction itself imposes sanctions on money coming in from or going out to the outside world (as did Greece, for a brief moment, in 2015)?
-Importantly, by dint of Section {{eqderivprov|12.8(e)}}, the {{eqderivprov|Determining Party}} may pass through hedge breakage costs and losses.
+Well, worst case, the holder of a [[long]] swap position might get a [[doughnut]]. The holder of a [[short]] position could, conceivably, lose even more, were the value of affected {{eqderivprov|Shares}} to ''spike'' during the sanctions, but that seems practically unlikely: the nature of economic sanctions and geopolitical turmoil tends not to boost local equity markets and, we imagine, generally would make affected shares go ''down'' in price. Here the problem might instead be that the holder of the short position ''can’t'' close out, despite desperately wanting to.
-If it’s a beast under the 2002 defs, it was going to be worse under the (ill-fated) [[2011 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions]], though it seems we will never know how just bad it was going to be. But, somewhere in the multiverse, there is alternative us, in a world just like this one, only in which the market adopted the 2011 Equity Derivatives Definitions. In that accursed universe, our mortal equivalents — people who otherwise look like you and me — who live, love, survive and thrive — are enduring this enduring hardship. It falls to [[Clifford Chance]] — not without some hubris, we feel — to imagine what that alternative universe might have been like for our alternate selves:
+In either case, the [[dealer]]’s attitude is likely to be the same: “I can’t see a [[bid-ask]] to do what I need to do to [keep a long position going/close a short position out] (''delete as applicable''). If you can find me such a bid or ask I can trade on I will, but if not, I regret to say you may get [[bupkis]].”
-:“This provision has been amended heavily and now runs to over 10 pages. It sets out different optional methods of calculating the transaction value, rather than following a purely replacement value approach (as under the 2002 Definitions) which was considered not to be appropriate in all cases. Greater detail is also provided as to how and when the {{eqderivprov|Cancellation Amount}} is to be determined, what data is to be taken into account and how losses/gains resulting from hedge close-outs are allocated.”
+Now the nature of geopolitical events is to be unpredictable. They may manifest themselves in different and unexpected ways, so — while no-one likes to rag on {{icds}} more than the [[JC]] does, readers, you know that — you can’t really blame [[the ’squad]] for not setting out the myriad of unintended knock-on consequences there might be to your equity derivative portfolio as a result of an unwarranted military incursion in the Urals.
-{{Nuts|Equity Derivatives|Cancellation Amount}}
+====Talk to your clients====
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions Section 12.8 TOC}}
+That said, it is all about managing expectations. The other typical characteristic of geopolitical hanky-panky is that it rarely comes out of the blue: it brews, there is posturing, brinkspersonship, manoeuvering before anything happens. ''This is a good time to get out and talk to your clients''. Remember the name of the game is to manage client expectations: a client who ''didn’t'' know it had some risk, even though it ''should'' have known (or, in fact ''did'' know<ref>This is an [[unknown known]] in the JC’s [[forensic epistemology]].</ref> but in a moment of motivated irrationality had conveniently ''forgotten'') is more likely to be upset when that risk materialises than one who ''did'' know, because you reminded it. [[Your goal is not to win litigation but avoid it|Your goal, remember, is not to ''win'' litigation with your customers, but ''avoid'' it]].
-{{box|
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(a)}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(b)}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(c)}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(d)}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(e)}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(f)}}
-{{2002 ISDA Equity Derivatives Definitions 12.8(g)}}}}