Template:M summ Pledge GMSLA 10: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
No edit summary
No edit summary
Line 7: Line 7:
There’s — at this particular moment in time, and no other — a little ''tension'' in the air. As {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} you need to satisfy your accountants that the assets really are yours, in case the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} unexpectedly blows up; the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} wants quick access to them, and to put aside all ceremony, in case ''you'' do.  
There’s — at this particular moment in time, and no other — a little ''tension'' in the air. As {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} you need to satisfy your accountants that the assets really are yours, in case the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} unexpectedly blows up; the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} wants quick access to them, and to put aside all ceremony, in case ''you'' do.  


Should we be unthinkably deep in the tail of improbable market events  such that ''both'' parties are blowing up simultaneously — the sort of event that Fisher Black would tell you ''ought to be'' unobservable in a period several times the life in the universe, but that {{author|Nassim Nicholas Taleb}} likes to remind us ''does'' happen once every five years or so, these two contingencies can arrive at once. On the theory, the Borrower’s interest trumps the Lender’s, since the security interest keeps teh assets out of range of the Borrower’s other creditors. But that is cold comfort for most [[Credit officer|credit sanctioners]], and besides, they don’t want to hang around waiting when collateral values are pogo-ing around with all the market dislocation.
Should we be unthinkably deep in the tail of improbable market events  such that ''both'' parties are blowing up simultaneously — the sort of event that Fisher Black would tell you ''ought to be'' unobservable in a period several times the life in the universe, but that {{author|Nassim Nicholas Taleb}} likes to remind us ''does'' happen once every five years or so these two contingencies can arrive at once. On the theory, the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}}’s interest trumps the Lender’s, since the security interest keeps the assets out of range of the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}}’s other creditors. But that is cold comfort for most [[Credit officer|credit sanctioners]], and besides, they don’t want to hang around waiting when collateral values are pogo-ing around with all the market dislocation.


Thus the dynamics dealing with who can tell the escrow agent to do what at any point in time are — ''sensitive'', shall we say. Nowhere did {{islacds}} address this in the document. It can be dealt with by a little [[grace period]], requiring the credit officer to wait, not for long, but for long enough to satisfy a financial reporting officer that there is enough time to settle any debts, call off the dogs and carry sedately on.
Thus the dynamics dealing with who can tell the escrow agent to do what at any point in time are — ''sensitive'', shall we say. Nowhere did {{islacds}} address this in the document. It can be dealt with by a little [[grace period]], requiring the credit officer to wait, not for long, but for long enough to satisfy a financial reporting officer that there is enough time to settle any debts, call off the dogs and carry sedately on.