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Template:M summ Pledge GMSLA 11: Difference between revisions
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So, how does default and close-out differ between title transfer and pledge versions of the GMSLA, then? Not as much as you might think. The mechanism for determining who owes what is broadly the same but, since the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} hasn’t parted company with the {{pgmslaprov|Collateral}} it has pledged — ''yet'' — and byt the theory of the game the pledged Collateral is sitting quietlky in a segregated account with a [[Triparty agent|triparty]] [[custodian]], ready to be returned or seized and liquidated, as the circumstances require, all of the {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} valuation mechanisms focus on the {{pgmslaprov|Loaned Securities}} leg of the transaction, since the Borrower won’t, if it has a scooby doo what it is doing, be holding the Loaned Securities at any time during the Loan. It will have [[Short selling|sold them short]]. | So, how does default and close-out differ between title transfer and pledge versions of the GMSLA, then? Not as much as you might think. The mechanism for determining who owes what is broadly the same but, since the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} hasn’t parted company with the {{pgmslaprov|Collateral}} it has pledged — ''yet'' — and byt the theory of the game the pledged Collateral is sitting quietlky in a segregated account with a [[Triparty agent|triparty]] [[custodian]], ready to be returned or seized and liquidated, as the circumstances require, all of the {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} valuation mechanisms focus on the {{pgmslaprov|Loaned Securities}} leg of the transaction, since the Borrower won’t, if it has a scooby doo what it is doing, be holding the Loaned Securities at any time during the Loan. It will have [[Short selling|sold them short]]. | ||
===It only really comes in to play if the Borrower has defaulted=== | |||
If the ''{{pgmslaprov|Lender}}'' has defaulted, you generally wouldn’t call an {{pgmslaprov|Event of Default}}. There is no need: the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} just returns the Loaned Securities, security is released from its pledged Collateral and we all carry on our sedated ways. I mean ''sedate'' ways. Sure, if you’re a masochist you ''could'' invoke the default process of Paragraph 11, but why would you? The {{gmslaprov|Loan}} is terminable at will; if you ''do'' want out, just terminate it and give {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} back. Far easier. | If the ''{{pgmslaprov|Lender}}'' has defaulted, you generally wouldn’t call an {{pgmslaprov|Event of Default}}. There is no need: the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} just returns the Loaned Securities, security is released from its pledged Collateral and we all carry on our sedated ways. I mean ''sedate'' ways. Sure, if you’re a masochist you ''could'' invoke the default process of Paragraph 11, but why would you? The {{gmslaprov|Loan}} is terminable at will; if you ''do'' want out, just terminate it and give {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} back. Far easier. | ||
If the ''{{pgmslaprov|Borrower}}'' has defaulted, ''de l’autre main'', there is the matter of getting | If the ''{{pgmslaprov|Borrower}}'' has defaulted, ''de l’autre main'', there is the matter of getting {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} back which (a) by our theory, the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}} hasn’t got, and would therefore have to go out to the market and get, and (b) the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} couldn’t, without the permission of its insolvency administrator, give back to you even if it did have one. Therefore the netting and close out provisions are quite handy. | ||
===How the closeout works | |||
Anyway, the process on any {{gmslaprov|Event of Default}} — but let’s presume for the sake of simplicity it is one committed by the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} — is this: | Anyway, the process on any {{gmslaprov|Event of Default}} — but let’s presume for the sake of simplicity it is one committed by the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} — is this: | ||
*All {{gmslaprov|Loan}}s are all accelerated, and the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}} is liable to return {{eqderivprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} as at the time of default. It won’t be able to of course, for the reasons given above. | *All {{gmslaprov|Loan}}s are all accelerated, and the {{gmslaprov|Borrower}} is liable to return {{eqderivprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}} as at the time of default. It won’t be able to of course, for the reasons given above. | ||
*So the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} works out the {{pgmslaprov|Default Market Value}} of the {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}}. It does this selling {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}}, getting and averaging quotes for the sale<ref>''Or purchase, but as discussed only an idiot Borrower would use the close-out provisions to terminate a Loan where a Lender defaulted.</ref> of {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}}, or, if it can’t, or the quotes seem out of whack, it can come up with its own opinion of their value, factor in any notional {{pgmslaprov|Transaction Costs}}, and use that. | *So the {{pgmslaprov|Lender}} works out the {{pgmslaprov|Default Market Value}} of the {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}}. It does this selling {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}}, getting and averaging quotes for the sale<ref>''Or purchase, but as discussed only an idiot Borrower would use the close-out provisions to terminate a Loan where a Lender defaulted.</ref> of {{pgmslaprov|Equivalent}} {{pgmslaprov|Securities}}, or, if it can’t, or the quotes seem out of whack, it can come up with its own opinion of their value, factor in any notional {{pgmslaprov|Transaction Costs}}, and use that. Expect an aggrieved Lender to confabulate some difficulty in getting good quotes and to go for using its own opinion more often than you’d necessarily expect. The {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}}’s bust, so what does he care, right? | ||
*The Lender can also confabulate I mean reasonably calculate its legal costs of closing out, and add those to the {{pgmslaprov|Default Market Value}} | |||
*Lastly, it can set off against amounts it owes to the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}} but, unlike under the title transfer {{gmsla}}, there aren’t likely to be many, seeing as the Collateral leg is not a title transfer collateral arrangement and is still technically owned by the {{pgmslaprov|Borrower}}. But not for long. | |||
Unlike under the {{gmsla}} the netting mechanic doesn’t ''do'' much. There isn’t much to net. The Lender has a large claim against the Borrower, for the Default Market Value, and it satisfies this by enforcing security under a separate {{gmslaprov|Security Deed}}. | |||