82,903
edits
Template:Repackaging limited recourse capsule: Difference between revisions
Template:Repackaging limited recourse capsule (view source)
Revision as of 16:37, 19 September 2023
, 19 September 2023no edit summary
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Amwelladmin (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| (2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
[[Secured, limited recourse obligation]]s are ''de rigueur'' for multi-issue [[repackaging]] [[SPV]]s. They save the cost of creating a whole new vehicle for each trade, and really only do by [[contract]] what establishing a brand new [[espievie]] each time would do through the exigencies of corporation law and the [[corporate veil]]. The point is to ''completely isolate each set of Noteholders from each other''. This is a surprisingly ''narrow'' point, as we will see, so we should not get carried away for the formalities of security. | |||
With [[secured, limited recourse obligation]]s there is a ''quid pro quo'': all creditors are known; they are yoked to the same ladder of priorities; they all have agreed to limit their claims to the liquidated value of the secured assets underlying the deal. In return, the [[espievie]] grants them a first-ranking security over those assets — mediated between them by the agreed priority structure — and this stopping any interloper happening by and getting its mitts on the [[espievie]]’s assets. | With [[secured, limited recourse obligation]]s there is a ''quid pro quo'': all creditors are known; they are yoked to the same ladder of priorities; they all have agreed to limit their claims to the liquidated value of the secured assets underlying the deal. In return, the [[espievie]] grants them a first-ranking security over those assets — mediated between them by the agreed priority structure — and this stopping any interloper happening by and getting its mitts on the [[espievie]]’s assets. | ||
The key point to absorb here: ''this is not a material economic modification to the deal''. The line it draws, it draws around ''all'' the assets underlying the deal: the underlying securities, cashflows deriving from them, the [[espievie]]’s rights against custodians and bankers holding them, and its rights against the swap counterparty — everything, tangible or otherwise, of financial value in the transaction is locked down and pledged to secured parties, and the intercreditor arrangements, too, are fully mapped out. This kind of [[limited recourse]], in fact, ''doesn’t'' limit recourse: it ''maps'' practical recourse, exactly to the totality of assets that the issuer has available for the purpose: all it saves is the unnecessary process of bankrupting a shell company with nothing left in it in any case. Secured limited recourse is like a [[nomological machine]]; a [[model]]; it is a simplified account where everything works as it should do, there are no unforeseen contingencies, and all outcomes are planned. <br> | The key point to absorb here: ''this is not a material economic modification to the deal''. The line it draws, it draws around ''all'' the assets underlying the deal: the underlying securities, cashflows deriving from them, the [[espievie]]’s rights against custodians and bankers holding them, and its rights against the swap counterparty — everything, tangible or otherwise, of financial value in the transaction is locked down and pledged to secured parties, and the intercreditor arrangements, too, are fully mapped out. This kind of [[limited recourse]], in fact, ''doesn’t'' limit recourse: it ''maps'' practical recourse, exactly to the totality of assets that the issuer has available for the purpose: all it saves is the unnecessary process of bankrupting a shell company with nothing left in it in any case. Secured limited recourse is like a [[nomological machine]]; a [[model]]; it is a simplified account where everything works as it should do, there are no unforeseen contingencies, and all outcomes are planned. | ||
{{limited value of security in repack}}<br> | |||