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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Difference between revisions
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{{a| | {{a|book review|}}{{br|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}} —{{author|Thomas Kuhn}} | ||
===Small and perfectly formed: one of the greats of 20th Century Philosophy=== | |||
A true classic of Twentieth Century literature, this wonderful little book, which argues for the contingency of scientific knowledge, deserves space on the bookshelf next to {{br|The Wealth of Nations}} (identifying the [[contingency]] of economic wellbeing and value), Hume’s {{br|A Treatise of Human Nature}} (causal scepticism), {{br|The Origin of Species}} (the contingency of biological development) and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (the contingency of language) - along with those perennially confusing continental stalwarts {{author|Friedrich Nietzsche}} and {{author|Ludwig Wittgenstein}}, as representing the fundamental underpinnings of modern Relativist thought. | A true classic of Twentieth Century literature, this wonderful little book, which argues for the contingency of scientific knowledge, deserves space on the bookshelf next to {{br|The Wealth of Nations}} (identifying the [[contingency]] of economic wellbeing and value), Hume’s {{br|A Treatise of Human Nature}} (causal scepticism), {{br|The Origin of Species}} (the contingency of biological development) and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (the contingency of language) - along with those perennially confusing continental stalwarts {{author|Friedrich Nietzsche}} and {{author|Ludwig Wittgenstein}}, as representing the fundamental underpinnings of modern Relativist thought. | ||
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Science does [[evolve]], through the great [[algorithm]] of human discourse, and the dominating theories through time will tend to be the ones which most of us are persuaded work the best for us (whether we’re right or not is really beside the point). What persuades in Tehran may differ from what persuades in Texas. All {{author|Thomas Kuhn}} cautions against is either side taking its own position as a given. | Science does [[evolve]], through the great [[algorithm]] of human discourse, and the dominating theories through time will tend to be the ones which most of us are persuaded work the best for us (whether we’re right or not is really beside the point). What persuades in Tehran may differ from what persuades in Texas. All {{author|Thomas Kuhn}} cautions against is either side taking its own position as a given. | ||
His enterprise is therefore fundamentally democratic, placing [[Epistemology|epistemological]] legitimacy in the hands of the entire community, as contingent and random as it may be from time to time, and not a self-selecting, self perpetuating elite. | His enterprise is therefore fundamentally democratic, placing [[Epistemology|epistemological]] legitimacy in the hands of the entire community, as contingent and random as it may be from time to time, and not a self-selecting, self-perpetuating elite. | ||
One thing economic theory tells us is that concentrating economic control in a small part of the population (as in a monopoly) generally works out worse for everyone except the monopolist. There’s no reason to suppose that concentrating intellectual authority should be any different. | One thing economic theory tells us is that concentrating economic control in a small part of the population (as in a monopoly) generally works out worse for everyone except the monopolist. There’s no reason to suppose that concentrating intellectual authority should be any different. | ||