Trade exposures with CCPs - CRR Provision: Difference between revisions

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 In which the {{crr}} requires that, for a clearing member to achieve a zero weighting on its exchange traded derivatives clearing business, it must first be able to pass losses occasioned by the default of a {{crrprov|CCP}} on to its client.
-====The [[clearing member]]’s own [[negligence, fraud or wilful default]]====
+===Where this came from===
+In the same way that that irritating guy with the [[Telecaster|Tele]] in the Redondo Guitar Center lists his influences as Hendrix, Sonic Youth and Mahler, this part of {{tag|CRR}} lists as its influences the [[BIS]] paper from April 2014, [[capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties]]. That assumes your brokers are all agents the way US [[futures commission merchant]]s are.
+''Twist'': European clearers generally act as [[riskless principal]]s. Cue ''tons'' of fun trying to work out what this all [[agency]] chat means for a [[principal]].
+===The BIS Paper===
+The BIS paper is predicated on the US [[FCM]] model where a [[clearing member]] or [[intermediate broker]] acts at all times as [[agent]]. It is in the nature of a [[disclosed agent|disclosed agency]] that the [[agent]] is not personally liable to perform of the contract, and does not therefore have credit risk to persons who are. Thus:
+*The starting assumption is that when finally executed, the parties to a futures contract are the client and the [[CCP]]. The intermediate entities are all agents and thus not responsible for performance of the contract. Therefore an intermediate broker’s performance and creditworthiness is not really a concern to an executing broker;
+*It would be most unusual for the executing broker to take any risk on the CCP, so it would only have to apply a risk-weighting against the CCP where it has actually guaranteed the CCP’s performance. This would be unusual, so the default assumption is that no risk weighting would apply.
+===This talks about [[CCP]]s. What about [[intermediate broker|intermediate brokers]]?===
+Well, you would like to think so. It doesn’t make a lot of sense otherwise. But CRR itself is silent on the point. But here's the read across:
+* The [[BIS]] [[Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties|paper on which CRR provision was modeled]] is framed in the positive: “Where the clearing member offers clearing services to clients, the 2% risk weight also applies to the clearing member’s trade exposure to the CCP ''that arises when the clearing member is obligated to reimburse the client for any losses suffered due to changes in the value of its transactions in the event that the CCP defaults''.”
+**The theory being that unless the clearing member has agreed otherwise, it wouldn’t be liable for those provisions in the first place: ie, it assumes an [[agency]] model (Common in the US) for client clearing.
+**The European model is a back-to-back [[principal]] model, however, so unless you’ve somehow carved it out, you ''would'' be liable for it, all other things being equal.
+*The BIS does talk about this a little: “The treatment in paragraph 192 to 194 may also apply to exposures of lower level clients to higher level clients in a multi-level client structure, provided that for all client levels in-between the conditions in (a) and (b) below are met.” The conditions (see [[Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties|here]] for their text) are predicated on all the structures being of an agency kind.
+*One is therefore obliged to extrapolate from an agency model to the economic equivalent under a principal model.
+===What about non-performance by a ''solvent'' [[intermediate broker]]?===
+===The [[clearing member]]’s own [[negligence, fraud or wilful default]]===
 But it will be a generous client indeed who does not insist on a [[carve-out]] from that right for defaults caused by the [[clearing member]]’s own [[Negligence, fraud or wilful default|negligence, wilful default or fraud]]. Would such a [[carve-out]] invalidate an application of {{crrprov|306(1)(c)}}?
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 Looking at it another way, if such a [[carve-out]] did invalidate {{crrprov|306(1)(c)}} then the provision would have no application at all, because it would be commercially impossible to remove it.
+{{sa}}
+*The [[Basel]] / [[BIS]] paper on which this turbulent regulation was based: [[Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties]]
+*[[Agency]] versus [[prini
 {{ref}}