Tragedy of the commons: Difference between revisions

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It is of a piece with [[game theory]] and the (single round) [[prisoner’s dilemma]], whereby, whilst it is in both parties ''common'' interest to co-operate, because of the skewed pay-offs if they don’t, both are incentivised to defect.
It is of a piece with [[game theory]] and the (single round) [[prisoner’s dilemma]], whereby, whilst it is in both parties ''common'' interest to co-operate, because of the skewed pay-offs if they don’t, both are incentivised to defect.


In the modern world there is a view that the [[digital commons]], being effectively unlimited, is not affected by the dilemma, so we can all tweet as many hot takes as we like without ruining anyone else’s ability to tweet their own hot-takes.
In the modern world there is a view that the [[digital commons]], being effectively unlimited, is not affected by the dilemma, so we can all tweet as many [[hot takes on Twitter|hot takes]] as we like without ruining anyone else’s ability to tweet their own hot-takes.


This does not stop grifters trying to flummox the unwary into chasing — and therefore paying for — artificial digital scarcity in the shape of domain names, [[non-fungible token]]s, physical spaces in the [[metaverse]] and exclusive beachfront properties on Crypto Island.<ref>What? Crypto Island is a ''physical'' island? Oh, come ''on''!</ref>
This does not stop grifters trying to flummox the unwary into chasing — and therefore paying for — artificial digital scarcity in the shape of domain names, [[non-fungible token]]s, physical spaces in the [[metaverse]] and exclusive beachfront properties on Crypto Island.<ref>What? Crypto Island is a ''physical'' island? Oh, come ''on''!</ref>