West Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn v Birmingham: Difference between revisions

West Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn v Birmingham (view source)

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 This question — should a “newly decided” [[Golden thread|thread]] of [[common law]] apply to human affairs pre-dating its development which were specifically constructed in contemplation of common law principles which, the new authority has adjudged to be wrong? — articulates the same paradox by which [[Kurt Gödel]] buggered up David Hilbert’s aspiration to describe a complete and consistent set of all mathematic axioms.<ref>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%27s_program David Hilbert’s program] </ref>
-How so? Well, bear in mind the starting presumption of [[common law]] [[jurisprudence]] is that it is not judge-made, but judge ''discovered'' — an ''objet trouvée'' inverted, signed and exhibited as is. Judges are merely expert scupltors, revealing the platonic details of the law as Michelangelo did when carving David from a marble block. Like David, the law was always there, encased in that block of — what? Semantic confusion? White noise? — it just took a craftsperson of sufficient skill and enlightenment to reveal it.
+[[File:Duchamp Fountaine.jpg|300px|thumb|left|A receptacle for the [[golden thread|golden stream]], yesterday.]]
+How so? Well, bear in mind the starting presumption of [[common law]] [[jurisprudence]] is that it is not judge-made, but judge ''discovered'' — an ''objet trouvée'' inverted, signed and exhibited as is. Judges are merely expert sculptors, revealing to the world the platonic details of the law as they find them, as Duchamp did when exhibiting his ''Fountain''. Like R Mutt’s pissoir, the law was always there — it just took a craftsperson of sufficient skill and enlightenment to reveal it in all its artistic beauty.
-Bear in mind another, apparently consistent presumption: the [[common law]]’s fundamental value is ''certainty''. Merchants need to know, moment to moment, that the legal foundations underpinning their commercial arrangements are not liable to shift. Hence, while statutes are transparently the creature of men and women and will not, without grave justification, be applied retrospectively, the common law suffers no such legislative fickleness: it is unchanging, for all times and for all men and all women.
+Bear in mind another, apparently consistent presumption: the [[common law]]’s fundamental value is ''certainty''. Merchants need to know, that the legal foundations underpinning their commercial arrangements are not liable to shift. Hence, while statutes are transparently the creature of men and women and will not, without grave justification, be applied retrospectively, the [[common law]] is hewn from more [[Ontological certainty|ontologically]] rigid stuff: it suffers no such legislative fickleness: it is unchanging, for all times and for all people.
-But judges, however excellent, are human. It is not beyond their powers to make a bish of things. So, what to do? And what if that very epistemological foundation falls apart on closer inspection. Could it be, after all, that the law is a social construction? That a fellow in a horsehair wig just ''made it up''? Should we look under our foundation to see if we can find any turtles?
+We just might be temporarily mistaken about it. For judges, however excellent, are all too human. It is not beyond contemplation that they might make a bish of things. So, what to do? And what if, in doing so, they reveal the camera trick, the hidden wire that supports  that very [[Epistemology|epistemological]] foundation falls apart on closer inspection. Where does it even come from? Could someone have made that up, too? Could it be, after all, that the law is a social construction? That a fellow in a horsehair wig just ''made it up''? Should we look under our foundation to see if we can find any turtles?
-Here is the paradox. Since newly decided cases overturn old ones, and the law does apply retrospectively, then by the jurisprudence of the law, the old law was ''never'' the law, even when everyone agreed it ''was''. But the device by which one discovers the old law isn't the law and the new law is the law is, itself, a fallible case. But here the jurisprudential principle “revealed” by {{Casenote|West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association Inc|Birmingham Corporation}} is that the [[common law]], as laid down by a decided case, may not be the [[common law]] after all. If it ''may'' not be it, it ''cannot'' be it: at best it is its shadow, flickering on the grotto wall, illuminated by Plato’s candle.
+Since newly decided cases overturn old ones, and the law does apply retrospectively, then by the jurisprudence of the law, the old law was ''never'' the law, even when everyone agreed it ''was''. But the device by which one discovers the old law isn't the law after all, and the new law ''is'' the law being, itself, a judge-made decision, is no less prone to reversal. In most cases, ''c’est la vie'' — that fee of small-time volatility buys a greater sense of overall meta-certainty.
-If it is right, being itself laid down by a decided case, it must by its own lights, be wrong. This is ''not'' the law. It is a fallible judge’s ''impression'' of the law. It is as susceptible of falsehood as the judgment which it overturns. Only if it is ''wrong'' can we have any certainty that it is ''right''.
+But not here, for here the the very jurisprudential principle “revealed” by {{Casenote|West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association Inc|Birmingham Corporation}} and therefore at stake ''is'' that wider meta-certainty: that the [[common law]], as laid down by a decided case, may not be the [[common law]] after all. If it ''may'' not be it, it ''cannot'' be it: at best it is its shadow, flickering on the grotto wall, illuminated by Plato’s unseen candle.
-So if you organised your affairs in reliance on what you, and everyone else, including the judiciary, at the time earnestly believed to be a tributary of the golden stream, but which a later revelation of the law shows to have been a bucket of piss, well that’s tough. But you therefore you can’t rely on the later revelation of the law either, because it too might turn out to be wrong.
+So here is the [[paradox]]: If ''West Midland'' is right, being itself laid down by a decided case, it must by its own lights, be wrong. This is ''not'' the law. It is a fallible judge’s ''impression'' of the law. It is as susceptible of falsehood as the judgment which it overturns. Only if it is ''wrong'' can we have any certainty that it is ''right''.
-Which means perhaps you ''can'' rely on the old precedent, as it might turn out ''not'' to have been a bucket of piss after all. But as long as this new ruling ''isn’t'' considered to be a bucket piss, you can’t. O tempora! O mores! O {{t|paradox}}!
+So if you organised your affairs in reliance on what you, and everyone else, including the judiciary, at the time earnestly believed to the [[golden stream]], but which a later revelation of the law shows to have been a bucket of piss, well that’s tough. But you therefore you can’t rely on the later revelation of the law either, because it too might turn out to be wrong.
+Which means perhaps you ''can'' rely on the old precedent, as it might turn out ''not'' to have been a bucket of piss after all. But as long as this new ruling ''isn’t'' considered to be a bucket piss, you can’t. ''O tempora! O mores! O {{t|paradox}}!''