West Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn v Birmingham: Difference between revisions

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West Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn v Birmingham (view source)

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 No, as it turned out.
 {{Capsule West Midland Baptist Trust}}
-===Goedel’s undecidability applied to the [[common law]]===
+===[[Goedel]]’s [[undecidability]] applied to the [[common law]]===
 This question — should a “newly decided” [[Golden thread|thread]] of [[common law]] apply to human affairs pre-dating its development which were specifically constructed in contemplation of common law principles which, the new authority has adjudged to be wrong? — articulates the same paradox by which [[Kurt Gödel]] buggered up David Hilbert’s aspiration to describe a complete and consistent set of all mathematic axioms.<ref>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%27s_program David Hilbert’s program] </ref>
 [[File:Duchamp Fountaine.jpg|300px|thumb|left|A receptacle for the [[golden thread|golden stream]], yesterday.]]
-How so? Well, bear in mind the starting presumption of [[common law]] [[jurisprudence]] is that it is not judge-made, but judge ''discovered'' — an ''objet trouvée'' inverted, signed and exhibited as is. Judges are merely expert sculptors, revealing to the world the [[platonic]] details of the law as they find them, as Duchamp did when exhibiting his ''Fountain''. Like R Mutt’s pissoir, the law was always there — it just took a craftsperson of sufficient skill and enlightenment to reveal it in all its artistic beauty.
+How so? Well, bear in mind the starting presumption of [[common law]] [[jurisprudence]] is that it is not judge-made, but judge ''discovered'' — an ''objet trouvée'' inverted, signed and exhibited as is. Judges are merely expert sculptors, revealing to the world the [[Platonic ideal|Platonic]] details of the law as they find them, as Duchamp did when exhibiting his ''Fountain''. Like R Mutt’s pissoir, the law was always there — it just took a craftsperson of sufficient skill and enlightenment to reveal it in all its artistic beauty.
 Bear in mind another, apparently consistent presumption: the [[common law]]’s fundamental value is ''[[certainty]]''. The [[JC]] has his own views about exactly when [[certainty]] as a virtue shifts from boon to bane, expounded [[Doubt|elsewhere]], but we can agree merchants need ''some'' idea that the legal foundations underpinning their commercial arrangements are not liable to shift. Hence, while statutes are transparently the creature of men and women and will not, without grave justification, be applied retrospectively, the [[common law]] is hewn from more [[Ontological certainty|ontologically]] rigid stuff: it suffers no such legislative fickleness: it is unchanging, for all times and for all people.
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 So here is the [[paradox]]: If ''West Midland'' is right, being itself laid down by a decided case, it must by its own lights, be wrong. It is ''not'' the law. It is a fallible judge’s ''impression'' of the law. It is as susceptible of falsehood as the judgment which it overturns. Only if it is ''wrong'' can we have any certainty that it is ''right''.
-So if you organised your affairs in reliance on what you, and everyone else, including the judiciary, at the time earnestly believed to the [[golden stream]], but which a later revelation shows to have been a bucket of piss, well that’s tough. But you therefore you can’t rely on the later revelation of the law either, because it too might turn out to be a bucket of piss.  Which means perhaps you ''can'' rely on the old precedent, as it might turn out ''not'' to have been a bucket of piss after all. But as long as this new ruling ''isn’t'' considered to be a bucket piss, you can’t.
+So if you organised your affairs in reliance on what you, and everyone else, including the judiciary, at the time earnestly believed to be the [[golden stream]], but which a later revelation shows to have been a bucket of piss, well that’s tough. But, therefore, you can’t rely on the later revelation of the law either, because it, too, might turn out to be a bucket of piss. Which means perhaps you ''can'' rely on the old precedent, as it might turn out ''not'' to have been a bucket of piss after all. But as long as this new ruling ''isn’t'' considered to be a bucket piss, you can’t.
 ''O tempora! O mores! O {{t|paradox}}!''