Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies: Difference between revisions

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 This is, as Perrow sees it, the central dilemma of the [[complex system]]. The nature of [[normal accidents]] is such that they need experienced, wise operators on the ground ready to think quickly and laterally to solve unfolding problems, but the enormity of the risks involved mean that central management are not prepared to delegate so much responsibility to the mortal, inconstant, narratising [[meatware]].
+=== How best to manage? ===
+The optimal means of managing differs depending on the type of risk.
+For non-linear, tightly coupled systems, like banks, this presents a control paradox: complex systems demand decentralised control and local, on-the ground expertise, to react quickly and wisely to unexpected events; tightly-coupled systems that are susceptible to chain reactions require centralised management to control the event quickly at any point in the organisation.
 ===What is to be done===
 Dumb operators aren’t the problem, but neither are those perennial culprits: technology, capitalism and greed.
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 Technology generally doesn’t ''create'' system accidents so much as fail to stop them and, at the limit, make them harder to foresee and deal with. And there is no imperative, beyond those of scale and economy, which are both very human imperatives to cut corners to profitability — that forces technology upon us. We choose it. We can complain about Twitter all we like, but — yeah.<ref>Twitter isn’t, of course a technology company. It’s a publisher.</ref>
-And while capitalism does generate externalities, unreasonably concentrate economic power, and reward those who have wealth out of all proportion to their contribution, a “capitalist” is no worse at this than a socialist one. (It is worth noting that Perrow was writing in 1984, where the distinction between “capitalist” and “socialist” economies was a good deal starker, and the social democratic third way had not really made itself felt. It is a curious irony that we ''feel'' ever more polarised now, whilst our political economies are far more homogenised. Even China, that last socialist standing, is closer to the centre than it was).
+And while capitalism does generate externalities, unreasonably concentrate economic power, and reward those who have wealth out of all proportion to their contribution, a “capitalist” is no worse at this than a socialist one. (Perrow was writing in 1984, where the distinction between “capitalist” and “socialist” economies was a good deal starker, and the social democratic third way had not really made itself felt. It is a curious irony that we ''feel'' ever more polarised now, whilst our political economies are far more homogenised. Even China, that last socialist standing, is closer to the centre than it was).
+{| class="wikitable"
+|+Suitability of centralisation or local control to management of different systems
+!
+!
+!Linear
+!Complex
+|-
+|Tight
+|Examples
+|Dams, power grids, rail transport, marine transport
+|Nuclear power plants, DNA, chemical plants, aircraft, space missions, BANKS
+|-
+|
+|Control method
+|'''Centralisation''': Best to deal with chain reactions, and best to deal with visible, expected linear reactions
+|'''Centralisation''': best to deal with chain reactions once they happen:
+Local control: best to deal with non-linear reactions and unexpected events as they happen.
+|-
+|Loose
+|Examples
+|Manufacturing, single-purpose agencies
+|Mining, Research and development, multi-purpose agencies, universities
+|-
+|
+|Control method
+|'''Centralisation or local control''': Few complex interactions; component failures create predictable results, and can be managed centrally.
+|'''Local control''': allows indigenous solutions where there is little risk of unstoppable chain reactions, and is best to deal with non-linear reactions and unexpected events as they happen
+|}
 And nor is greed — perhaps the thread that connects the capitalist entrepreneur to the socialist autocrat (let’s face it: it connects ''everyone'') any more causative — or, if it is, it is baked in to the human soul, so can’t really be solved for.
-Perrow thinks it is better to look at the by product of these three modes in itself: ''externalities'': the social costs of activity that are not reflected in its price, and borne by those who do not benefit from the activity. When the externality is powered by a tightly-coupled, non-linear system it can be out of all proportion to the bounties conferred on beneficiaries of that system — who are often a different class of individuals altogether
+Perrow thought it better to look at the by-product of these three modes as the problem in itself: ''[[Externality|externalities]]'': the social costs of the activity that are not reflected in its price, and borne by those who do not benefit from the activity. When the externality is powered by a tightly-coupled, non-linear system it can be out of all proportion to the bounties conferred on beneficiaries of that system — who are often a different class of individuals altogether. The Union Carbide accident at Bhopal being a great example: few of the half-million casualties would have bought a Duracell battery, let alone Union Carbide shareholders, and only 1,000 were employees.
+This led Perrow to frame his approach to the problem by reference to “catastrophic potential”, which may present itself as ''inherent'' catastrophic potential: the nature of the activity is tightly-coupled and non-linear such that no amount of reorganisation can prevent occasional system accidents, or  ''actual'' catastrophic potential: preventable shortcomings in any of the design, equipment, procedures, operators, supplies and materials, and environment, or component failures in the system could have catastrophic potential — these being things one can theoretically defend against, whereas inherent catastrophic potential is not; against in each case the cost of alternative solutions to the same problem.
+This leads to three categories of system. Those one should tolerate but seek to improve (mining, chemicals, dams, airways) those one should restrict (marine transport and DNA), and those one should abandon altogether, the benefits, however great, being out of all proportion with their downside risk. Here he includes nuclear weapons — no surprise — but also nuclear power).
 This is a long review already, so I should stop here. This is a fantastic book. It is somewhat hard to get hold of — there’s no audio version alas —but it is well worth the effort of trying.