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Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (view source)
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This is, as Perrow sees it, the central dilemma of the [[complex system]]. The nature of [[normal accidents]] is such that they need experienced, wise operators on the ground ready to think quickly and laterally to solve unfolding problems, but the enormity of the risks involved mean that central management are not prepared to delegate so much responsibility to the mortal, inconstant, narratising [[meatware]]. | This is, as Perrow sees it, the central dilemma of the [[complex system]]. The nature of [[normal accidents]] is such that they need experienced, wise operators on the ground ready to think quickly and laterally to solve unfolding problems, but the enormity of the risks involved mean that central management are not prepared to delegate so much responsibility to the mortal, inconstant, narratising [[meatware]]. | ||
===What is to be done=== | |||
Dumb operators aren’t the problem, but neither are those perennial culprits: technology, capitalism and greed. | |||
Technology generally doesn’t ''create'' system accidents so much as fail to stop them and, at the limit, make them harder to foresee and deal with. And there is no imperative, beyond those of scale and economy, which are both very human imperatives to cut corners to profitability — that forces technology upon us. We choose it. We can complain about Twitter all we like, but — yeah.<ref>Twitter isn’t, of course a technology company. It’s a publisher.</ref> | |||
And while capitalism does generate externalities, unreasonably concentrate economic power, and reward those who have wealth out of all proportion to their contribution, a “capitalist” is no worse at this than a socialist one. (It is worth noting that Perrow was writing in 1984, where the distinction between “capitalist” and “socialist” economies was a good deal starker, and the social democratic third way had not really made itself felt. It is a curious irony that we ''feel'' ever more polarised now, whilst our political economies are far more homogenised. Even China, that last socialist standing, is closer to the centre than it was). | |||
And nor is greed — perhaps the thread that connects the capitalist entrepreneur to the socialist autocrat (let’s face it: it connects ''everyone'') any more causative — or, if it is, it is baked in to the human soul, so can’t really be solved for. | |||
Perrow thinks it is better to look at the by product of these three modes in itself: ''externalities'': the social costs of activity that are not reflected in its price, and borne by those who do not benefit from the activity. When the externality is powered by a tightly-coupled, non-linear system it can be out of all proportion to the bounties conferred on beneficiaries of that system — who are often a different class of individuals altogether | |||
This is a long review already, so I should stop here. This is a fantastic book. It is somewhat hard to get hold of — there’s no audio version alas —but it is well worth the effort of trying. | This is a long review already, so I should stop here. This is a fantastic book. It is somewhat hard to get hold of — there’s no audio version alas —but it is well worth the effort of trying. | ||