Greenclose v National Westminster Bank plc: Difference between revisions

The intellectual endeavour here is interesting: Firstly, to deduce the meaning of the words in that agreement Andrews J looks at ''the intention of the person who crafted the {{1992ma}}'', and not the intentions of the parties who actually negotiated the agreement. The agreement was signed in 2006 - by which stage email was widely known and understood, and it seems fanciful to suggest parties would intend to include all [[electronic messaging systems]] ''but'' [[email]]. There is a long disquisition on what ISDA intended, which this reviewer submits is utterly irrelevant because ISDA was not a party to the contract.

Andrews J needs also to draw a peculiar, narrow meaning of the word "system" to rule that while email may be a means of communicating electronic messages, it is not conducted via a "system". [[SWIFT]] is a system. [[SMTP]] over the [[Internet]] is apparently not.

What's oddest about this is that the court needed to make ''none'' of these assertions to find that the purported means of service wasn't valid, because ''Greenclose hadn't specified an email address in the ISDA Schedule''.  Simply put, if I don't agree an email address to which you can send me messages, you can't send me a notice that complies with Section {{isdaprov|12}}, however you construe it. Greenclose didn't specify an email address. Case closed.