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Greenclose v National Westminster Bank plc: Difference between revisions
Greenclose v National Westminster Bank plc (view source)
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, 25 May 2016→The errors
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Andrews J needs also to draw a peculiar, narrow meaning of the word "system" to rule that while email may be a means of communicating electronic messages, it is not a "system". [[SWIFT]] is a messaging system. [[SMTP]] over the [[Internet]] is, apparently, not. You have to squint really hard and hold your head in a funny way to follow that logic. | Andrews J needs also to draw a peculiar, narrow meaning of the word "system" to rule that while email may be a means of communicating electronic messages, it is not a "system". [[SWIFT]] is a messaging system. [[SMTP]] over the [[Internet]] is, apparently, not. You have to squint really hard and hold your head in a funny way to follow that logic. | ||
What's oddest about this is that the court needed to make ''none'' of these assertions to find NatWest's attempted service wasn't valid, because ''Greenclose hadn't specified an email address in the ISDA {{isdaprov|Schedule}}''. | What's oddest about this is that the court needed to make ''none'' of these assertions to find NatWest's attempted service wasn't valid, because ''Greenclose hadn't specified an email address in the ISDA {{isdaprov|Schedule}}''. Simply put, ''there was no agreed email address to which NatWest could send Greenclose a message'', however you construe Section {{isdaprov|12}}. Greenclose didn't specify an email address. Therefore communication by email (within in the contemplation of Section {{isdaprov|12}}) wasn't possible. Case closed. | ||
(Andrews J also was exercised mightily about whether a notification, even if undisputedly effective, not consistent with Section {{isdaprov|12}} would count for the purposes of exercising options under the {{isdama}}. Andrews J chose the path less travelled, in finding that "any notice or other communication ''may'' be given in any manner described below" meant it may ''only'' be given in that manner. Which raises the question: what if the court found on the facts that a non-compliant notice had, nonetheless made its way to the relevant person, been appropriately adverted to: would it still follow substance over form? | |||
But what would the court have found if [[Greenclose]] ''had'' specified an email address? That he was wrong to do so, because that wasn't an identifier on a valid "[[electronic messaging service]]"? | But what would the court have found if [[Greenclose]] ''had'' specified an email address? That he was wrong to do so, because that wasn't an identifier on a valid "[[electronic messaging service]]"? | ||