Doctrine of precedent: Difference between revisions

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====On whether there is anything new under the sun====
====On whether there is anything new under the sun====
The [[doctrine of precedent]] stands in contradistinction to realistic, pragmatic [[Epistemology|theories of knowledge]] which recognise that since, as a brute fact, the class of things that have not yet happened yet is unlimited and, however compendious it may be, the class of “previously encountered things under the sun” may be, it is necessarily finite, and that since an infinite number divided by a finite one is still infinite, then managing risk by only doing what you’ve always done isn’t enormously prudent.
The [[doctrine of precedent]] stands in contradistinction to realistic, pragmatic [[Epistemology|theories of knowledge]] which recognise that since, as a brute fact, the class of “things that have not yet happened yet” is — to the best of anyone’s knowledge — unlimited and, however compendious it may be, the class of “things that have already happened” may be, it is necessarily finite. Since infinity divided by a finite number is still infinity, managing unknowable risk by doing only what you’ve always done isn’t enormously prudent.


And nor is there much to be said for closing your stable door once your horse has bolted, either.
And nor is there much to be said for closing your stable door once your horse has bolted, either.