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The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind: Difference between revisions
The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (view source)
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* improbable that, seeing as it asserts a novel and revolutionary scientific hypothesis, this book was distributed and published outside the usual academic channels; | * improbable that, seeing as it asserts a novel and revolutionary scientific hypothesis, this book was distributed and published outside the usual academic channels; | ||
* improbable that a single individual, apparently working more or less alone, authored such an imaginative, dazzling and, to be frank, brilliant, multi-discipline synthesis (I counted anthropology, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, neurology, and classics among the unrelated disciplines Jaynes writes insightfully on); and | * improbable that a single individual, apparently working more or less alone, authored such an imaginative, dazzling and, to be frank, brilliant, multi-discipline synthesis (I counted anthropology, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, neurology, and classics among the unrelated disciplines Jaynes writes insightfully on); and | ||
* improbable that, without the imprimatur of serious academic support (as I understand it, Jaynes never had tenure, though he was friends with [[W. V. O. Quine]], which doubtless stands for something), this book was even taken seriously, let alone proved as resistant to serious academic challenge (philosopher Ned Block had a half-hearted go, and there was a well publicised review by | * improbable that, without the imprimatur of serious academic support (as I understand it, Jaynes never had tenure, though he was friends with [[W. V. O. Quine]], which doubtless stands for something), this book was even taken seriously, let alone proved as resistant to serious academic challenge (philosopher Ned Block had a half-hearted go, and there was a well publicised review by {{author|Daniel Dennett}} (''[https://philpapers.org/rec/DENJJS Julian Jaynes’ Software Archaeology]'') but its critique was of emphasis rather than substance, and was otherwise largely complimentary. Other than that, {{author|Richard Dawkins}} has spent a lazy couple of sides outlining the theory, only to feebly remark that the book “is either complete rubbish or a work of consummate genius ...” and while he suspects the former, can’t muster the intellectual energy to decide so is “hedging his bets”). | ||
But there’s one way it isn’t improbable, and that’s the most remarkable of all: its credibility. The thesis at first blush seems outlandish, yet in Jaynes’ hands it deftly explains a number of cultural artifacts of antiquity, including religion itself, that traditional anthropology has been unable to sensibly account for. | But there’s one way it isn’t improbable, and that’s the most remarkable of all: its credibility. The thesis at first blush seems outlandish, yet in Jaynes’ hands it deftly explains a number of cultural artifacts of antiquity, including religion itself, that traditional anthropology has been unable to sensibly account for. | ||
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Jaynes states this hypothesis upfront — at which point it seems quite outrageous — then patiently, elegantly and compellingly sets out his case. His exegesis is always a pleasure and is truly enlightening at times: his discussion of the difference between “{{tag|consciousness}}” and “perception” is fascinating. Essentially, Jaynes points out that a lot less of our cognitive experience is genuinely “conscious” than we apprehend. When Bertrand Russell exemplified consciousness in the proposition “I see a table”, Jaynes suggests “Russell was not conscious of a table, ''but of the argument he was writing about''” — namely that he saw a table.) | Jaynes states this hypothesis upfront — at which point it seems quite outrageous — then patiently, elegantly and compellingly sets out his case. His exegesis is always a pleasure and is truly enlightening at times: his discussion of the difference between “{{tag|consciousness}}” and “perception” is fascinating. Essentially, Jaynes points out that a lot less of our cognitive experience is genuinely “conscious” than we apprehend. When Bertrand Russell exemplified consciousness in the proposition “I see a table”, Jaynes suggests “Russell was not conscious of a table, ''but of the argument he was writing about''” — namely that he saw a table.) | ||
Jaynes sources his limited notion of consciousness in the origin of language, and in particular the {{tag|metaphor}}. Again, a controversial view, but by no means inconsistent with the sort of outlook you might find in Wittgenstein or Rorty, for example. | Jaynes sources his limited notion of consciousness in the origin of language, and in particular the {{tag|metaphor}}. Again, a controversial view, but by no means inconsistent with the sort of outlook you might find in {{author|Ludwig Wittgenstein}} or {{author|Richard Rorty}}, for example. | ||
So is Jaynes right? If you subscribe to the importance of [[metaphor]], this is the wrong question to ask (of Jaynes’, or ''any'' theory). A better question is whether it is a useful way of looking at our world. I think it is: you can never have too many metaphorical tools in your toolbox. | So is Jaynes right? If you subscribe to the importance of [[metaphor]], this is the wrong question to ask (of Jaynes’, or ''any'' theory). A better question is whether it is a useful way of looking at our world. I think it is: you can never have too many metaphorical tools in your toolbox. | ||