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The ease with which one can buy or sell an [[asset]]. So a [[US T-Bill]] is very [[liquid]] — you can buy or sell any number in the blink of an eye; a power station in the lawless mountainous badlands of central Asia is very illiquid — it | The ease with which one can buy or sell an [[asset]]. So, a [[US T-Bill]] is very [[liquid]] — you can buy or sell any number in the blink of an eye; a power station in the lawless mountainous badlands of central Asia is very ''illiquid'' — it may take three years of [[due diligence]], all kinds of legal, regulatory and accounting engineering, and the conveyance of a few bags of cash in brown paper bags to local gentlemen in Kalashnikov-equipped Hiluxes. | ||
===Illiquidity=== | ===Illiquidity=== | ||
Liquidity is really a function of the ease with which demand and supply can be matched. It will always be a job with big, complex, privately held assets, but even | [[Liquidity]] is really a function of the ease with which demand and supply can be matched. It will always be a job with big, complex, privately held assets, but even usually liquid assets (like listed [[equities]]) can suddenly become illiquid. This could happen: | ||
*'''When the [[issuer]] is in trouble'''. Then, all the world’s a seller, and no-one is buying. Hence: liquidity zero. Sellers are stuck with assets they don’t want. | *'''When the [[issuer]] is in trouble'''. Then, all the world’s a seller, and no-one is buying. Hence: liquidity zero. Sellers are stuck with assets they don’t want. This kind of illiquidity is [[credit]]-related. | ||
*'''When the market is in trouble''': In 2007 the [[credit crunch]] was caused by reliable investors suddenly deserting the [[commercial paper]] market to conserve their own cash reserves | *'''When the market is in trouble''': In 2007 the [[credit crunch]] was caused by reliable investors (typically commercial and investment banks), spooked about their own capital positions, suddenly deserting the [[commercial paper]] market to conserve their own cash reserves, rather than anything specific to the AAA assets they were buying<ref>although the assets they were buying, notionally AAA rated [[asset-backed securities|asset-backed]] [[commercial paper]], were pants, and many of the [[CP]] buyers knew this, having structured them themselves</ref>. Thus the old saw: “don't use short-term assets (like commercial paper) to fund long-term liabilities (like mortgages)”. Not the great example, because there was an element of credit concern in the strike, but the point remains that illiquidity can be driven by ''[[lender]]'' credit weakness, not necessarily ''[[borrower]]'' credit weakness. | ||
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*[[Liquidity period]] | *[[Liquidity period]] | ||
*[[Illiquidity]] | *[[Illiquidity]] | ||
*[[Term]] | |||
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