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An exercise in calculating economic outcomes by means of {{tag|metaphor}}. | An exercise in calculating economic outcomes by means of {{tag|metaphor}}. | ||
Two people are | Two people are charged with a conspiracy<ref>Whether or not they are guilty is beside the point. If it helps you empathise with their predicament, assume they’re innocent</ref>. Each is held separately. They cannot communicate. There is enough evidence to convict both on a lesser charge, but not the main charge. Each prisoner is separately offered the same plea bargain. The offer is: | ||
*If A informs B but B refuses to inform on A: | *If A informs B but B refuses to inform on A: | ||
**A will not be prosecuted | **A will not be prosecuted at all and will go free | ||
**B will be | **B will be convicted of the main charge and will get '''3''' years in prison. | ||
*If A informs B ''and'' B informs on A: | *If A informs B ''and'' B informs on A: | ||
**A will | **A will get 2 years in prison | ||
**B will | **B will get 2 years in prison | ||
*If A refuses to inform on B and B refuses to inform on A: | *If A refuses to inform on B and B refuses to inform on A: | ||
**A will | **A will get 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge). | ||
**B will | **B will get 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge). | ||
===[[single round prisoner’s dilemma]]=== | |||
If you play this game in isolation the payoff is grim: | |||
{{seealso}} | |||
*[[I believe]] | |||
{{ref}} | {{ref}} | ||
{{draft}} | {{draft}} |