Hedging Disruption - Equity Derivatives Provision: Difference between revisions

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{{eqderivanat|12.9(a)(v)}}
{{eqderivanat|12.9(a)(v)}}
===Regulator informal action===
===Regulator informal action===
Does a [[regulator]]’s direction to ditch a hedge mean a {{eqderivprov|Hedging Party}} is “unable to commercially reasonably maintain” its [[hedge]]? As long as there is no regulatory-approved alternative means of hedging (you know, but [[futures]], for example), then yes – the apprehension of sanction by the regulator (be it a monetary penalty, adverse publicity or the regulator barring you from operating in its market or even a dim view being taken) - just the general aspiration to maintain good relations with a body having power to regulate your operations — provided it is sincere — is a [[reasonable]] commercial consideration which would prevent you from maintaining that hedge.
Does a [[regulator]]’s direction to ditch a hedge mean a {{eqderivprov|Hedging Party}} is “unable to commercially reasonably maintain” its [[hedge]]?  
 
As long as there is no regulatory-approved alternative means of hedging (you know, [[futures]], for example), then the [[JC]] says '''yes'''. The aspiration to maintain good relations with a body having power to regulate your operations, let alone a plausible apprehension of sanction (be it a monetary penalty, adverse publicity or the regulator barring you from operating in its market or just taking a dim view of your outfit) — provided it is sincere — is a [[reasonable]] commercial consideration which would prevent you from maintaining that hedge.


===Why the “why should I pay your hedging costs? I have no control over them” argument is bogus===
===Why the “why should I pay your hedging costs? I have no control over them” argument is bogus===