Greenclose v National Westminster Bank plc: Difference between revisions

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{{fullanat2|isda|electronic messages|2002|Electronic messages|1992}}
{{fullanat2|isda|electronic messages|2002|Electronic messages|1992}}
A fine example of that old legal maxim ''[[anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt]]'': Little old ladies (and, in this case, aggrieved Welsh hotel owners) make bad law, {{casenote|Greenclose|National Westminster Bank plc}} ([https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/1156.html&query=(title:(+greenclose+)) judgment]) opines on the apparently harmless {{isdaprov|Notices}} Section (Section {{isdaprov|12}}) of the {{1992ma}}. In particular, it considers the meaning of “[[electronic messaging system]]” and, saucily, finds that it does not include [[email]].
A fine example of that old legal maxim ''[[anus matronae parvae malas leges faciunt]]'': Little old ladies (and, in this case, aggrieved Welsh hotel owners) make bad law, {{casenote|Greenclose|National Westminster Bank plc}} ([https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/1156.html&query=(title:(+greenclose+)) judgment]) opines on the apparently harmless {{isdaprov|Notices}} Section ({{isdaprov|12}}) of the {{1992ma}}. It considers the meaning of “[[electronic messaging system]]” and, saucily, finds that it does not include [[email]].


Let me say that again, in case you missed it: in the eyes of the common law as articulated by [[Andrews J]], '''[[email]] does not count as an “[[electronic messaging system]]”'''.
Let me say that again, in case you missed it: in the eyes of the current [[common law]] '''[[email]] does not count as an “[[electronic messaging system]]”'''.


===Facts===
===Facts===
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This was the hinge point of the case: does [[email]] count as an [[electronic messaging system]] under {{1992ma}}? No, thought the court, because:
This was the hinge point of the case: does [[email]] count as an [[electronic messaging system]] under {{1992ma}}? No, thought the court, because:


{{box|“In 1992, email was not in common use and thus the reference to “[[electronic messaging system]]” is unlikely to have been intended to include it.”}}
:''“In 1992, email was not in common use and thus the reference to “[[electronic messaging system]]” is unlikely to have been intended to include it.”''


The court does not seem to have heard any evidence on this point. A cursory glance at Wikipedia would suggest this is wildly wrong: the SMTP protocol, over which email is still transferred today, was published in 1982. It is true that the ''expression'' “email” didn’t enter the lexicon until 1993 – ''but that is consistent with nascent email being treated as a kind of [[electronic messaging system]]''.
The court does not seem to have heard any evidence on this point. A glance at Wikipedia would suggest this is wildly wrong: the SMTP protocol, over which email is still transferred today, was published in 1982. It is true that the ''expression'' “email” didn’t enter the lexicon until 1993 – ''but that is consistent with it being treated back then as just a kind of [[electronic messaging system]]''.


The court compared the {{1992ma}} with the {{2002ma}}, which ''does'' include [[email]], ''as a separate item from “[[electronic messaging system]]”'':
The court compared the {{1992ma}} with the {{2002ma}}, which ''does'' include [[email]], ''as a separate item from “[[electronic messaging system]]”'':


{{box|{{ISDA Master Agreement 2002 12}}}}
Side note: This is the only plausible grounds for the decision: Clearly, by 2002, someone at ISDA had decided that email and electornic messaging systems were different things. A curious view — but then, isn’t so much of our beloved {{isdama}} delightfully curious?


The intellectual endeavour here is interesting: Firstly, to deduce the meaning of the agreement, the court looked at ''the intentions of the person who drafted the form of {{1992ma}}, and not those of the parties who negotiated this actual agreement''. Here’s the point: ''ISDA was not a party to the contract''. It may have been agreed on ISDA's 1992 form, but it was signed in 2006, by which stage “[[email]]” was widely known and understood.  
The intellectual endeavour here is interesting: Firstly, to interpret the agreement, the court looked at ''the intentions of the committee who drafted the form of {{1992ma}}, and not those of the parties who negotiated this actual agreement''. But ''ISDA was not a party to the contract''. Sure, it may have been on [[ISDA]]’s 1992 form, but it was signed in 2006, by which time “[[email]]” ''was'' common. The expectations of some Luddite banking specialists when they crafted a standard form nearly two decades earlier really ought to have been besides the point.  


And why, in 2006, would parties deliberately include all [[electronic messaging system]]s ''except'' [[email]], especially since email is the only system vaguely answering the description of an “[[electronic messaging system]]” than a hotel owner in Wales would be likely to have?
In any case, why in 2006 would parties deliberately include all [[electronic messaging system]]s ''except'' [[email]]? All the more so, since email is the only means of communication even vaguely corresponding to “an [[electronic messaging system]]” than a Welsh hotelier would be likely to have?


The court also needed also to draw a peculiar, narrow meaning of the word “system” to rule that while [[email]] may be a means of communicating electronic messages, it is not a “system”. [[SWIFT]], thought the court, is a messaging system. [[SMTP]] over the [[Internet]] it thought, is not. You have to squint really hard and hold your head in a funny way to follow that logic. Hotel owners in Wales ''can’t'' communicate by [[SWIFT]]. Whether or not they had modern email in mind, the drafters of the {{1992ma}} certainly weren’t contemplating Welsh hoteliers.
The court also needed also to draw a peculiar, narrow meaning of the word “system” to rule that while [[email]] may be a means of communicating electronic messages, it is not a “system”. [[SWIFT]], thought the court, is a messaging system. [[SMTP]] over the [[Internet]] is not. You have to squint really hard and hold your head in a funny way to follow that logic. Hotel owners in Wales ''can’t'' communicate by [[SWIFT]]. Whether or not they had modern email in mind, the drafters of the {{1992ma}} certainly weren’t contemplating Welsh hoteliers.


What’s oddest about this is that the court needed to make ''none'' of these assertions to find NatWest’s attempted service invalid, because ''Greenclose hadn’t specified an email address in the ISDA {{isdaprov|Schedule}} in any case''. Simply put, ''there was no agreed email address to which NatWest could send Greenclose a message'', however you construe Section {{isdaprov|12}}. Therefore, valid communication by email “under Section {{isdaprov|12}}” ''wasn’t possible''. Case closed.
What’s oddest about this is that the court needed to make ''none'' of these assertions to find service invalid, because ''Greenclose hadn’t supplied an email address in the {{isdaprov|Schedule}} in any case''. However you construe Section {{isdaprov|12}}, ''there was no agreed email address to which NatWest could send Greenclose a message''. Therefore, valid communication by email “under Section {{isdaprov|12}}” ''was not possible''. Case closed.


(The court was also exercised mightily about whether a non-conforming notification, even if in fact effective, would count for the purposes of exercising options under the {{isdama}}. Here again it chose the path less travelled, in construing the statement “any notice or other communication ''may'' be given in any manner described below” to mean it may ''only'' be given in that manner.  
(The court was also exercised mightily about whether a non-conforming notification, even if effective, would count for the purposes of exercising options under the {{isdama}}. Here again it chose the path less traveled, construing the statement “any notice or other communication ''may'' be given in any manner described below” as meaning it may ''only'' be given in that manner.  


Which raises a subsidiary question: what if the court had found that a notice, though non-compliant, had, in actual fact, been delivered to the recipient? Would the court still follow substance over form and disallow the claim?  
Which raises another question: what if the court had found that a notice, though non-compliant, ''had'', in fact, been delivered to Mr. Greenclose? Would it still follow [[Substance and form|substance over form]] and disallow the claim?  


And what would the court have found if [[Greenclose]] ''had'' specified an email address? That he was wrong to do so, because that wasn’t an identifier of a valid “[[electronic messaging system]]”?
And what if Mr. [[Greenclose]] ''had'' specified an email address? That he was wrong to do so, because that wasn’t an identifier of a valid “[[electronic messaging system]]”?


The world is a less certain place.
Questions that won’t be answered for now, as NatWest did not appeal the decision. The world is a less certain place.
 
Questions that won’t be answered for now, as NatWest has not appealed the decision.


{{seealso}}
{{seealso}}
*[https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/1156.html&query=(title:(+greenclose+)) [[Andrews J]]’s Judgment]
*[https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/1156.html&query=(title:(+greenclose+)) [[Andrews J]]’s Judgment]
*[[The Victory of Form over Substance]]