Candle problem: Difference between revisions

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It turns out those incentivised to be greedy capitalist rent-seekers were disinclined to collaborate, forced themselves into a narrow, white-knuckle footrace towards the goal and ''didn’t do very well''. Those without the pressure to kill or be killed collaborated and, on average, solved the problem far more quickly. This really ought not need a Ted Talk to point out. The incentives are all wrong: they discourage collaboration of the sort which obviously will help in solving the problem.
It turns out those incentivised to be greedy capitalist rent-seekers were disinclined to collaborate, forced themselves into a narrow, white-knuckle footrace towards the goal and ''didn’t do very well''. Those without the pressure to kill or be killed collaborated and, on average, solved the problem far more quickly. This really ought not need a Ted Talk to point out. The incentives are all wrong: they discourage collaboration of the sort which obviously will help in solving the problem.
===The end of history?===
Any way, in this way, by the simple expedient of [[libtard|metropolitan liberal]] reasoning, was naked capitalism finally falsified, vanquished and logicked out of existence. As a result, there aren’t any [[Investment bank|investment banks]] any more, the canals of Venice run clear, the sky over Zhengzhou is a brilliant polaroid blue, and unicorns gamble in the wildflower meadows of Rotherhithe.


Any way, in this way, by the simple expedient of [[libtard|metropolitan liberal]] reasoningwas naked capitalism finally falsified, vanquished and logicked out of existence. As a result, there aren’t any [[Investment bank|investment banks]] any more, the canals of Venice run clear, the sky over Zhengzhou is a brilliant polaroid blue, and unicorns gamble in the wildflower meadows of Rotherhithe.
Well, not quite. But the insistence of big organisations on narrow, stupid compensation models maddens Daniel Pink, giver of said TED talk, who rails at the absurdity and venality of our institutions, whose leaders stick religiously to the traditional bonus structure in the face of overwhelming evidence that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t just madden Pink, it ''baffles'' him.
===What motivates bankers===
But {{author|Daniel Pink}} is proving wrong point here. The puzzle isn’t the how “autonomy, mastery, and purpose” will motivate people more than money — who didn’t, instinctively, know that? — but why our corporate overlords who, in their reflective moments, surely must know that as well, ignore this plain, ''[[a priori]]'' fact.


Well, not quite. But the insistence of big organisations on narrow, stupid compensation models maddens Daniel Pink, giver of said TED talk, who rails at the absurdity and venality of our institutions, whose leaders stick religiously to the traditional bonus structure in the face of overwhelming evidence that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t just madden Pink, it ''baffles'' him.
As ever, the [[JC]] has a theory: it is all about personal incentives. In the same way that the average wage-slave’s major driver during the entirety of her career is [[fear]], the major driver for the captains of industry who run our banks is ''personal enrichment''. Solving the organisation’s, and its clients’, actual problems and achieving its commercial goals is a second order priority: a means to the primary end, but should they conflict it will lose.  


But he seems to be addressing the wrong puzzle here. The puzzle isn’t the how “autonomy, mastery, and purpose” will motivate people more than money — who didn’t, instinctively, know that? — but why our corporate overlords who, in their reflective moments, surely must know that as well, ignore this plain, ''[[a priori]]'' fact.
Now consider the candle incentives. The CEO is in an excellent position to decide who should get that $25 first prize. His management suite, if they think they might get a fiver, are likely to agree with him. The remainder of the group may well have a different view, but they are hardly in a position it advance it, because no-one is listening. The reason they are not listening is because they are considering their own situation. In the individual incentive model, to fund to total incentive will cost $150 ($25 for the CEO and 150 between the 25 board members).  


As ever, the [[JC]] has a theory. It’s because the people who run corporates aren’t, actually interested in solving the organisation’s, much less its clients’ actual problems, but seeing to their own personal enrichment. That is far better served by an inventive structure under which they, as leaders, will be the ones pocketing that lion’s share.
The CEO will ask himself how much better the whole group would have to do, for ''him'' to get $25 through collaboration? This means ''everyone else'' would have to get $25. That total cost of $2,500 would be a ''huge'' total increase in performance of the whole undertaking.
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