Conflicts of interest: Difference between revisions

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{{a|g|}}In which we find our intrepid [[Jolly contrarian|contrarian]] once again standing alone, among the crumbs, crusts of bread and crossfire hurricanes.  
{{a|g|}}In which we find our intrepid [[Jolly contrarian|contrarian]] once again standing alone, among the crumbs, crusts of bread and crossfire hurricanes.  


[[Conflicts of interest]] aren’t some kind of ''regrettable'' externality of life: they ''are'' life. For if one adopts the dystopian view — well, you might call it dystopian; some of us find it strangely comforting — that if left alone, all human beings will instinctively feather their own nests at every opportunity they get — we should see [[conflicts of interest]] not as some kind of canker, to be identified and expunged wherever we find it, but as a fundamental part of the operating system — as inevitable as getting grease on your hands when you handle a bike-chain.
[[Conflicts of interest]] aren’t some kind of ''regrettable'' [[externality]] of life: they ''are'' life. For if one adopts the dystopian view — well, you might call it dystopian; some of us find it strangely comforting — that if left alone, all human beings will instinctively feather their own nests at every opportunity they get — we should see [[conflicts of interest]] not as some kind of canker, to be identified and expunged wherever we find them, but as a fundamental part of the operating system — as inevitable as getting grease on your hands when you handle a bike-chain.


There is an argument — one I suppose I just made up, but others may have beaten me to it — that the difference between a ''practical'' philosophy and an ''idiotic'' one is the degree to which it encodes as its starting assumption, that all men — ''and'' women, though in our times it’s easy to forget that — are ''jerks'', and have to physically restrain themselves from scoffing all the biscuits, and even then only do so if they think they’ll get busted if they don’t.
There is an argument — one I suppose I just made up, but others may have beaten me to it — that the difference between a ''practical'' philosophy and an ''idiotic'' one is the degree to which it encodes as its starting assumption, that all men — ''and'' women, though in our times it’s easy to forget that — are ''jerks'', and have to physically restrain themselves from scoffing all the biscuits, and even then only do so if they think they’ll get busted if they don’t.